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CASENOTES
SECURITIES LAW-Rule 10b-5-The Birnbaum Doctrine is
Affirmed: Only a Purchaser or Seller of Securities May Main-
tain a Private Action for Monetary Damages Under Rule lOb-5.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
The finding of an implied private right of action' under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 served as the genesis of prodigious
federal corporate litigation.3  In an effort to circumscribe the sweeping
language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 4 promulgated thereunder, courts
1. The implied private right of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, see notes
2, 4 infra, was first held to exist in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946). Without discussing its rationale, the Supreme Court, in passing, con-
firmed the existence of that implied private right of action in Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). Nevertheless, the existence of
such a right is not without its critics. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5:
Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963).
2. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970),
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so reg-
istered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(emphasis added).
3. As the Supreme Court noted in Securities and Exchange Commission v. National
Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969): "§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 may well be the most
litigated provisions in the federal securities laws ....... Id. at 465. For recent statis-
tics regarding the number of section 10(b) securities class actions crowding federal dock-
ets, see Schwartz, The Class Action: Its Incidence and the Eisen Case, 30 Bus. LAw. 155
(1974 special issue).
4. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice, to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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adopted various limiting doctrines. 5 Foremost among them has been the
much maligned "purchaser-seller" requirement enunciated by the Second
Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.6 Attempting to limit standing,
the Birnbaum court held that only a plaintiff who had purchased or sold
securities could maintain an action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
7
After 20 years of controversy among commentators and lower court judges,
the Supreme Court, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores," granted
certiorari in a case which enabled it to rule on the continued vitality of the
Birnbaum doctrine.
Pursuant to an antitrust consent decree, "Old Blue Chip" was to merge
into a newly formed corporation, "New Blue Chip". Under the plan, New
Blue Chip was required to offer its shares of common stock to retailers who
had previously used the stamp service but who were not shareholders in the
old company. The plan was adopted, the offering was registered with the
SEC, and a prospectus was distributed to all offerees. Thereafter, Manor
Drug Stores filed a class action on behalf of all former users of Blue Chip
stamps alleging that, in a deliberate attempt to discourage it and others in the
class from accepting the offer, Blue Chip intentionally distributed an overly
pessimistic prospectus which was materially misleading. Manor sought to
bring the action notwithstanding the fact that it had neither purchased nor
sold Blue Chip securities. Indeed, the gravamen of the complaint was that
because of, and in reliance on, the false and misleading prospectus, class
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
(emphasis added).
5. Courts have applied such limiting concepts as reliance, e.g., List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); causation, e.g., Barnett
v. Anaconda Co., 283 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); scienter, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971); and privity, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth
Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). For an excellent discus-
sion of these and other limiting doctrines as they may or may not apply to section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5, see Comment, SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 860 (1972).
6. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
The list of articles dissecting the Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement seems endless.
E.g., Jacobs, Birnbaum in Flux: Significant 10b-5 Developments, 2 SEc. REG. L.J.
305 (1975); Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 30 Bus. LAw. 167 (1974
special issue); Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEXAS
L. REv. 617 (1974); Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the
Missing Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1973). For a comprehensive list of articles
written prior to 1973, see Comment, The Birnbaum Doctrine Revisited: Standing to
Sue Under Rule 10b-5 Analyzed, 37 Mo. L. REv. 481, 482 n.19 (1972).
7. 193 F.2d at 464.
8. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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members failed to purchase the securities which were, by court decree,
required to be offered to them.9
The district court, relying upon Birnbaum, dismissed Manor's claim
because the plaintiffs, who were neither purchasers nor sellers of the securi-
ties in question, lacked standing to sue. 10 On appeal, however, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the peculiar facts in Blue Chip warranted an
exception to the Birnbaum standing rule because the antitrust decree created
a contractual relationship which essentially brought the plaintiffs within the
definition of purchaser-seller." Additionally, the Court noted that since the
plaintiffs had a right to purchase securities at a fixed price and at fixed
amounts, damages could be readily ascertained, thereby minimizing the prob-
lems of proof and causal connection between the alleged 10b-5 violation and
the injury.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 12 reversed
the Ninth Circuit, holding that an offeree of a stock offering who had neither
bought nor sold any of the shares offered in an allegedly misleading
prospectus could not maintain a private action for money damages under
rule lOb-5.' 3 The Court declined to remove the procedural roadblock to
maintaining a private action under rule lOb-5 and affirmed the Birnbaum
doctrine. The majority 'based its decision on an admittedly vague legislative
intent, 20 years of lower court precedent, and what it termed "policy
considerations.' 4  Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, argued
that the Birnbaum doctrine was an artificial mechanism which frustrated the
broad antifraud purpose of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. He suggested
that the true test of a valid rule 10b-5 claim would be "the showing of a
logical nexus between the alleged fraud and the sale or purchase of a
security."' 5  The divergence of opinion reflected by the majority and
dissenting views is indicative of the confusion which section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 have generated among courts seeking to define their scope and intent.
9. Id. at 726.
10. 339 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
11. 492 F.2d 136, 142 (9th Cir. 1974).
The same panel which decided Blue Chip had recently faced the question of the con-
tinued vitality of the Birnbaum rule in Mt. Clemens v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.
1972). Although upholding Birnbaum, the Mt. Clemens court nevertheless permitted
a nonpurchaser-seller to bring suit under section 10(b). However, the court stressed the
importance of a contractual relationship. See notes 47 & 85 infra.
12. Justices Stewart, White, Marshall and Powell joined in the opinion.
13. 421 U.S. at 755.
14. Id. at 749.
15. Id. at 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Concurring in the dissent were Jus-
tices Brennan and Douglas.
[Vol. 25:402
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I. THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTENT
The Securities Act of 193316 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193417
were designed as broad proscriptions against the investor fraud permeating
the securities markets of the 1920's.1 8 Attempts to elucidate the meaning of
section 10(b), which prohibits manipulation and deception in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security and which is thought by many to be
the broadest antifraud provision in the federal securities laws, 19 have been
numerous and generally unsatisfactory due to the dearth of specific informa-
tion available regarding the congressional intent underlying its adoption.
20
Indeed, section 10(b)'s specific role in the overall scheme of federal
securities law remains a mystery. Conceived as a catch-all, 2' section 10(b)
has been acknowledged as such and has been liberally interpreted by the
Supreme Court.
22
Realizing that it could not foresee and, therefore, could not legislate
against every fraudulent securities practice,2 3 Congress specifically provided
in section 10(b) that the SEC could make "rules and regulations ...
as necessary and appropriate in the public interest. ' 24  Thereafter, in 1942,
the SEC promulgated rule 10b-5. 25  At the time the rule was issued, section
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-z (1970).
17. Id. §§ 78a-hh.
18. See A. BROMBERO, SECURITIES LAw FRAUD-SEC RULE 10b-5, § 2.2, at 19-21
(1967). See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934), and H. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6 (1934), for general statements as to the scope and intent of
the 1934 Act. For a brief discussion of the overriding purpose, as the Court saw it.
of all the securities legislation passed between 1933 and 1940, see SEC v. Capital Gains
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963).
19. See generally BROMBERG, supra note 18, §§ 4.7, 8.7.
20. See id. § 2.2(331).
21. Perhaps the most frequently cited authority on this point is a principal legislative
draftsman, Thomas G. Corcoran:
Subsection (c) [altered insignificantly to become Section 10(b)] says,
"Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices".... .Of course subsection
(c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7852
and 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934). See also 3 L. Loss, SECURIES REGULATION
1421-30 (2d ed. 1961).
22. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
23. See H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1934).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), reprinted note 2 supra.
25. For an informative analysis of what was then a relatively new rule 1Ob-5 and
its relation to other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, see Note, The Prospects for
Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120
(1950).
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
17(a) of the 1933 Act 26 made it unlawful to defraud purchasers of
securities, and section 15(c) of the 1934 Act 27 proscribed fraud perpetrated
by brokers or dealers in the purchase or sale of securities. Nothing in either
Act provided liability for fraud perpetrated by purchasers or upon sellers by
those other than brokers or dealers. It is generally accepted that the rule
was designed to close this loophole and to extend liability to fraudulent
purchasers of securities. 28  In drafting rule 10b-5, the Commission virtually
copied the language of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. It did, however,
substitute "any person" for "the purchaser" and added the phrase "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." More than one com-
mentator has asked why, if the rule were intended to extend solely to fraud
in the purchase of securities, it also refers to sales.29  As with section
10(b), the lack of specific language in rule 10b-5 has left its intent
beclouded and its scope indefinite.
II. THE Birnbaum DOCTRINE: EXCEPTIONS AND REJECTION
Accepting the fact that there was an implied private right of action under
section 10(b)30 and faced with the vagueness of the section, Judge Augustus
Hand, in the Birnbaum opinion, rationalized the court's conclusions by rely-
ing on what he believed to be the SEC's intent in promulgating rule 10b-5.
81
26. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act proscribes fraud "in the offer and sale of securi-
ties." 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
27. Section 15(c)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1970), provides in
pertinent part:
No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to in-
duce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security . . . in connec-
tion with which such broker or dealer engages in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative act or practice, or makes any fictitious quotation.
28. After adopting rule 10b-5, the SEC issued a press release explaining its purpose:
The Securities and Exchange Commission announced the adoption of a rule
prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities.
The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied
only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or
companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.
SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). See 421 U.S. at 736, citing Freeman, Confer-
ence on Codification of the Federal Securities Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967). See
also Loss, The Opinion, 24 Bus. LAw. 527, 535 (1969). For an interesting and in-
formative analysis of the regulatory objectives of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
as the SEC sees them, see SEC, Adoption of Rule 19b-2 Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, at 36-53, Jan. 16, 1973.
29. Compare Comment, 37 Mo. L. REV., supra note 6, at 491-92, with Comment,
13 WM. & MARY L. REV., supra note 5, at 865.
30. See note 1 supra.
31. Hand specifically cited the SEC Release, see note 28 supra, m support of his con-
[Vol. 25:402
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Although he admitted that the rule "may have been somewhat loosely
drawn," 2 Hand reasoned that since the purpose of the rule was to close the
loophole between sections 17(a) and 15(c) to include nonbroker-dealer
purchasers, the SEC did not intend to protect all persons from securities
fraud, including would-be investors.3 8  According to the Birnbaum court's
analysis, section 10(b) was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation
or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of
securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and
rule 1Ob-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.
3 4
Although little remains today of two aspects of the original three-pronged
Birnbaum test,3 5 the standing requirement that in order to bring suit under
section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 a plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller
of securities, has survived.
3 6
Because the Birnbaum doctrine may result in an injured party being
clusion. 193 F.2d at 463. Professor Loss contends that the Birnbaum court's reli-
ance on the SEC's enunciated purpose in promulgating rule lOb-5 was incorrect,
since the rule was in conflict with the broader congressional intent of the 1934
Act to protect all investors. Such a conflict, he believes, must be resolved in favor of
the congressional purpose unless the statute specifically provides otherwise. 3 L. Loss,
supra note 21, at 1469.
32. 193 F.2d at 463.
33. In Birnbaum, the president and controlling stockholder of Newport Steel declined
a merger which would have been profitable to Newport's minority shareholders and, in-
stead, sold his controlling block of stock at a premium to a third party who wished to
use Newport as a captive source of supply in a tight steel market. Alleging that this
premium sale constituted fraud in violation of section 10(b), the minority shareholders
sued.
34. 193 F.2d at 464.
35. The "usually associated with" limitation was virtually extinguished in A.T. Brod
& Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), in which the court stated:
We believe that 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities whether the artifices em-
ployed involved a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of
deception.
Id. at 397 (emphasis added). As for the prohibition against bringing suit under rule
lob-5 for fraudulent corporate mismanagement, it has been largely undermined by the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971). A discussion of the great impact which Bankers Life has had on
the potential liability of defendants for fraudulent corporate mismanagement is beyond
the scope of this article. The interested reader should see Fleischer, Federal Regulation
of Internal Corporate Affairs, 30 Bus. LAw. 179 (1974 special issue).
36. In Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), it was established that the de-
fendant need not be a purchaser or seller for a lOb-5 action to lie against him. This
was confirmed in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971),
in which the Supreme Court held that "§ 10(b) bans the use of any deceptive device
in the 'sale' of any security by 'any person.' " Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
1976]
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denied recourse to federal court,37 lower courts have generally not hesitated
to interpret liberally the terms "purchaser" and "seller."38  Accordingly,
such diverse persons as beneficiaries of testamentary trusts, 39 beneficial
shareholders in debenture redemption plans, 40 trustees in bankruptcy,
41
issuers of stock, 42 minority shareholders in short-form mergers, 43 merging
corporations, 44 shareholders in liquidation proceedings, 45 and personal rep-
37. A disappointed federal litigant may seek relief under a state statute or under the
common law theory of fraud in state courts. However, an action under rule 10b-5 pro-
vides distinct advantages (e.g., procedural advantages, application to broader class of per-
sons, and easier standards of proof). BROMBERG, supra note 18, § 4.7(1), at 83.
38. The Birnbaum rule has been accepted by virtually every circuit confronting the
issue, although there is disagreement as to the scope of its application. See, e.g., Landy
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Mt. Clemens
Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d
221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse
China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). Cf.
Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 738-40 (10th Cir. 1974). But see Eason
v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
The rationale behind the courts' expansive interpretation of purchase and sale was
aptly stated in Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970):
We do not say that only those who are purchasers or sellers in the "strict
common law traditional sense" . . . may maintain an action for damages un-
der Rule lob-5. . . . In deciding whether a plaintiff has standing, we search
for what will best accomplish the congressional purpose .... Thus we construe
the "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" clause found in
both the section and the rule broadly and flexibly to effectuate that purpose.
. .. The "purchaser"-"seller" standing requirement is to be similarly con-
strued . . . so that the broad design of the section and the rule is not frustrated
by the use of novel or atypical transactions.
Id. at 806-07.
39. James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 484 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
40. Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972).
41. Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971).
42. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. de-
nied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
43. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967). This case established the "forced seller" doctrine, under which the plain-
tiff who never sells his securities, but as a matter of law is forced to part with them
as a result of the defendant's fraudulent scheme, may maintain a 10b-5 action. See, e.g.,
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); H.K. Porter Co., v. Nichol-
son File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.
1970). Compare Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1969), with Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
44. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977
(1967). But see In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528 (3rd Cir. 1974)
(exchange of shares in corporate reorganization considered not to fall within scope of
purchaser-seller requirement).
45. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 25:402
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resentatives of purchasers and sellers46 have all been permitted to sue under
rule 10b-5. Courts have also developed the "aborted seller" doctrine, which
permits plaintiffs who but for the defendant's fraudulent conduct would have
sold their stock to maintain a lOb-5 action. 47 Similarly, plaintiffs who have a
contractual right to buy or sell, but who are misled into inaction, may
maintain a suit under 10b-5. 48  Moreover, if a plaintiff is misled into
inaction because of the fraudulent misrepresentations of the defendant, but
later purchases or sells, that purchase or sale has been held to satisfy the
Birnbaum requirement. 49  When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, the
purchaser-seller requirement has been abandoned altogether.5" This trend
of broadly construing the terms of purchaser and seller was seen by many as
46. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
47. See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Mount
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972), in which the Ninth Circuit
declared that there may be an aborted seller only when there "is the existence of a con-
tractual relationship between the parties which elevate[s] the plaintiffs to the status of
statutory purchasers or sellers." Id. at 345 & n.11. In Blue Chip, the Ninth Circuit
attempted to use the aborted seller doctrine to permit the plaintiffs standing by reasoning
that the antitrust consent decree created the functional equivalent of a contract to buy
or sell. For an interesting article discussing the evolution and importance of the con-
tractual relationship in 10b-5 actions as the Ninth Circuit perceives it, see Comment,
Chipping Away at the Birnbaum Doctrine, 8 LOYOLA U. (L.A.) L.J. 171 (1975). See
Forseter, Rule 10b-5 Violations in the Ninth Circuit: "I Know It When I See It.",
30 Bus. LAw. 773 (1975), for a critical analysis of the confusion which reigns in the
Ninth Circuit regarding the interpretation of securities law in general.
48. See, e.g., Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (customer's
action against broker-dealer for failure to carry out contract for sale of stock); Com-
merce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (action by
plaintiffs for fraudulent failure to consummate agreement); Goodman v. H. Hentz &
Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (action by plaintiffs who would have been pur-
chasers but for the alleged fraud of the registered representative).
49. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 796-98 (2d Cir. 1969);
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("The words 'in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security' . . . do not require that the pur-
chase or sale immediately follow the alleged fraud." Id. at 219.). Contra, Hirsh v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
50. In Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967), the court
reasoned that the Birnbaum limitation was primarily designed to ensure that the plaintiff
could prove damages and causation. However, since suits for injunctive relief do not
require proof of damages, the court felt that there was no reason to insist on the pur-
chaser-seller requirement. Compare Tully v. 'Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834
(D.N.J. 1972) (retrospective injunctive relief granted to nonpurchaser-seller), with Lut-
gert v. Vanderbilt Bank, 508 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1975) (questioning the wisdom of de-
parting from the Birnbaum doctrine even for immediate injunctive relief). Regarding
the possibility of prospective injunctive relief, see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). No purchaser-seller limitation is imposed on the
SEC in its enforcement actions. See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453
(1969).
1976]
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an erosion of the Birnbaum doctrine and was welcomed as a harbinger of its
demise. 51
What might have beeen the final blow to the vitality of the doctrine ap-
peared to come in 1973 in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,52 in
which the Seventh Circuit disregarded the purchaser-seller requirement com-
pletely and declared that "[the Birnbaum doctrine] is not part of the law
of this circuit. ''58  Rather than expand the definition of purchaser-seller to
fit yet another unique situation,5 4 the Eason court rejected altogether the no-
tion that the plaintiffs need be characterized as sellers to maintain an action
under section 10(b). Instead, to determine whether or not the plaintiffs
should have standing to sue, the court examined the rationale underlying the
implied private right of action established in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co.55 Kardon held that a civil action could be maintained by a member of
a class "for whose special benefit the statute was enacted."' '56 The Birnbaum
court interpreted the class of those protected by section 10(b) through rule
1Ob-5 to be only purchasers and sellers.5 7
The Eason court, however, reasoned that since neither the congressional
history, the statute, the rule, nor any Supreme Court decision signified that
only purchasers or sellers of securities have legal rights protected by rule
lOb-5, the correct interpretation of the standing requirement for a lOb-5
action is the constitutional question of whether the plaintiff whose standing is
challenged is the proper person to request adjudication of the particular
issue.58 Essentially, the court utilized the two-pronged standing test enunci-
51. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for
Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
52. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
53. 490 F.2d at 661.
54. In Eason, the plaintiffs were shareholders in Bank Service Corporation, which
entered into an agreement to purchase the leasing division of Dave Waite Pontiac, Inc.
As consideration for the business, Bank Service issued stock to Waite and assumed the
liabilities of the leasing business. Bank Service assumed Waite's notes payable to
GMAC, and the individual plaintiffs delivered a guarantee on those notes. Bank Service
defaulted; GMAC brought suit to recover on the guarantees and the plaintiffs counter-
sued alleging fraud under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
55. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
56. Id. at 514. Noting that there was no express civil action stated in section 10(b)
in contrast to those stated in sections 9, 16 and 18 of the 1934 Act, the Kardon court
rested its decision primarily on a basic common law theory of statutory tort liability,
i.e., a person injured by violation of a statute enacted for the benefit of persons in his
position is entitled to recover damages. Cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33, 39 (1916). Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934) (upon which the Kar-
don court relied), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
57. See pp. 406-07 supra.
58. 490 F.2d at 657-58. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 99 (1968) (standing
permitted only when the dispute is in an adversary context and in a form historically
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ated in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp.59 According to that decision, a plaintiff must allege that the actions
he is complaining of have, in fact, caused him injury60 and that "the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question."6 1
Having established that the plaintiffs had a sufficient interest in the
dispute to satisfy the article 11I case or controversy standard, the Eason court
then decided that the plaintiffs did, indeed, belong to the class for whose
benefit rule lOb-5 had been adopted.62 The court found support for its de-
cision not only in its conclusion that the Birnbaum doctrine had been so fre-
quently circumvented that it lacked "integrity," 63 but more importantly,
in the broad language of several recent Supreme Court decisions regarding
section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. Primary among them was Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.6 4  In Bankers Life, the Court
specifically stated that section 10(b) "must be read flexibly, not technically
and restrictively."'6 5  Significantly, the Court emphasized the fact that
section 10(b) "outlaws the use 'in connection with the purchase or sale' of
any security of 'any manipulative or deceptive device .... ' "966 It
concluded that the plaintiff "suffered an injury as a result of deceptive
practices touching its sale of securities as an investor."
'6 7
Encouraged by the "touching" test in Bankers Life, which indicated an
extremely liberal interpretation of the "in connection with" language of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the Eason court devised its "investor injury"
criteria under which all "persons who, in their capacity as investors, suffer
significant injury as a direct consequence of fraud in connection with a
viewed as capable of judicial resolution); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)
(party seeking adjudication must have a personal stake in the issue).
59. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
60. Id. at 152.
61. Id. at 153.
62. 490 F.2d at 657-58.
63. Id. at 659.
64. 404 U.S. 6 (1971), rev'g 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970). The Eason court also
cited Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), in which the Court
dealt primarily with the reliance requirement in lob-5 actions and stressed a broad inter-
pretation of the securities laws. Like Bankers Life, Affiliated Ute has had far-ranging
implications on section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions. For a thoughtful analysis of how
far beyond the common law the Court has gone in defining the nature, scope and re-
quirements of a federal action under rule lOb-5, see Note, The Reliance Requirement in
Private Actions Under SEC Rule l0b-5, 88 HAiv. L. REv. 584 (1975).
65. 404 U.S. at 12.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added). See also note 35 supra.
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
securities transaction" 6s shall have standing to sue. In making its determin-
ation, the Eason court was not persuaded by the frequently advanced policy
arguments that the purchaser-seller requirement is necessary to prevent an
"unmanageable flood of federal litigation,"' 9 nor by the need to preserve
national consistency in the interpretation of federal securities law; rather, it
called upon the Supreme Court to resolve the conflicts which existed
throughout the circuits regarding the use of the Birnbaum doctrine.
70
III. THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS
Blue Chip is, indeed, a direct response to Eason and a complete rebuttal
of the investor injury standing criteria enunciated therein. Rather than
broadly construing the "in connection with" language of section 10(b), the
Supreme Court in Blue Chip declared that the language must be read
narrowly as it relates to plaintiffs who are purchasers or sellers. Although
the Court confirmed that it previously decided that there is an implied
private right of action under section 10(b), 71 the language in Blue Chip
suggests that the Court was questioning the wisdom of that decision and was
seeking to limit its magnitude. Nevertheless, having accepted an implied
private right of action under section 10(b), the Court was then faced with
the problem of delimiting those who might bring suit under rule lOb-5. The
Court, like lower courts before it, found that affirmation of the Birnbaum
purchaser-seller doctrine established the appropriate boundary.
To justify use of the doctrine, the Court reasoned that section 17(a), after
which section 10(b) was patterned, specifically prohibits fraud "in the offer
or sale" of a security. On the other hand, section 10(b) makes no mention
of offer, but only proscribes fraud in connection with the "purchase or sale"
of securities. Therefore, the Court concluded that when a remedy was
68. 490 F.2d at 659. The Eason court apparently glossed over the Supreme Court's
strained attempt to characterize the plaintiff in Bankers Life as a seller. See 404 U.S.
at 9-10. For an excellent discussion of the investor injury theory causation approach
to standing taken in Eason, see Note, Standing to Sue in 10b-5 Actions: Eason v.
GMAC and Its Impact on the Birnbaum Doctrine, 49 NOTRE D. LAw. 1131 (1974).
69. 490 F.2d at 660.
70. Id. at 661.
71. 421 U.S. at 730, citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). In the landmark decision of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964), the Supreme Court confronted, for the first time, the question of whether
an implied private right of action exists under the 1934 Act. In determining that there
is such a right under section 14(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970), the Court relied
on the statutory tort benefit theory and demanded that federal courts "'adjust their rem-
edies so as to grant the necessary relief' where federally secured rights are invaded." 377
U.S. at 433, quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). See also Wyandotte
Trans. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
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intended for those who neither purchased nor sold securities, Congress
expressly provided for one.
72
Admitting that the legislative intent of section 10(b) is "not conclusive,"
the Court sought to lend further support to its conclusion that the purchaser-
seller requirement is vital to maintaining an action under section 10(b) by
examining the rationale behind the implied private right of action. Rather
than focusing on the statutory tort benefit theory expounded in Kardon,73
the Supreme Court noted that one of the justifications advanced for an
implied private right action under section 10(b) was found in section 29(b)
of the 1934 Act,7 4 which provides that an individual who makes a contract
in violation of any provisions of the 1934 Act may void that contract. With-
out the presence of a contract of sale or of an actual purchase or sale of se-
curities, however, the rescission remedy granted by section 29(b) would not
be applicable; thus, the section 29(b) justification is absent. Moreover, the
Court argued that since the provisions of the Act which do provide for an
express private civil remedy do so only for individuals who have, in fact, pur-
chased or sold securities, it would be incongruous to ascribe to Congress an
intent to establish broader liability under an implied cause of action. 75 The
Court reasoned that when there is no purchase, no sale, and no contractual
right created, there is simply no justification for a private right of action under
section 10(b). 76  Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court
72. 421 U.S. at 734. The Court also noted that, although section 10(b) does not,
numerous other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide for express rights of private
action. Id. at 730 n.4, 734. The language of the Court is unclear, but it may be
suggesting that it is willing to accept a concept clearly rejected by the Kardon court
when it established the private right of action under section 10(b): when there are simi-
larities among sections, a remedy omitted in one section, but included in another,
strongly suggests that it was deliberately omitted and not intended to be read into the
former. See BROMBERG, supra note 18, § 2.4(1), at 27. Similar arguments disputing
the existence of a civil remedy under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 have been rejected
by lower courts. See, e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1953);
Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 737 (1944).
73. See note 56 supra.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1970).
75. The Court specifically noted section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q
(1970); section 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970); section 16(b) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970); and section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb
(1970). 421 U.S. at 733-34.
76. Id. at 735. For further justification for limiting the use of rule lOb-5 to pur-
chasers or sellers the Court noted that in both 1957 and 1959 the SEC sought from
Congress an amendment of section 10(b), changing its wording from "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security" to "in connection with the purchase or sale
of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any security." Id. at 732 (citations omitted).
On both occasions Congress refused the SEC's request, thereby suggesting to the
Court that Congress did not intend section 10(b) to cover anyone but actual pur-
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held that the antitrust decree did not create a contractual relationship be-
tween the parties which would elevate Manor Drug to the status of a pur-
chaser or seller.
Conceding that the statutory interpretation arguments could not offer
conclusive guidance regarding congressional intent as "to the contours of a
private cause of action,"'77 the Court noted that since the judiciary itself had
implied and developed the cause of action, it must assume the burden of
delimiting those who might bring suit under rule lOb-5. 78 In affirming the
Birnbaum doctrine, the Court recognized that the doctrine has as a disadvan-
tage the preclusion of some worthy claims. Nevertheless, the Court thought
that countervailing policy considerations were more weighty. The Court was
concerned that without a purchase or sale requirement, the evidence of a
plaintiff's injury would be highly subjective, damages would be speculative,
and the outcome of the trial would hinge upon unreliable oral testimony.
Moreover, summary judgment would be largely unavailable and since
frivolous claims and strike suits could not be weeded out before trial,
defendants might be forced into unjustified settlements to avoid protracted
discovery.
79
Although the policy considerations voiced by the majority are certainly
worthy of consideration, the soundness of utilizing them to bar potential
chasers and sellers of securities. For an excellent discussion of whether or not there
should be an implied private right of action under section 17(a), upon which section
10(b) is modeled, see Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act-The Wrong
Place for a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 44 (1973).
In its amicus briefs, the SEC has consistently urged the courts to abandon the pur-
chaser-seller requirement in order to further the broad remedial purpose of the 1934 Act.
See, e.g., Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 23-33, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1974).
77. 421 U.S. at 737.
78. The Court noted:
When we deal with private actions under rule 10b-5 we deal with a judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.
We are dealing with a private cause of action which has been judicially
found to exist, and which will have to be judicially delimited one way or an-
other ....
Id. at 737, 749.
79. While the Eason court discounted the notion stressed by Judge Hufstedler in her
lower court dissent in Blue Chip that the abandonment of the Birnbaum doctrine would
create an unmanageable caseload for the federal dockets and would increase the potential
for strike suits and "bad cases", 490 F.2d 660 n.25, citing Manor Drug Stores v. Blue
Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 146 (9th Cir. 1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), the Court
in Blue Chip agreed with Hufstedler and expressed grave concern over the danger of




plaintiffs from relief granted under the implied private right of action is
highly questionable. Whenever a right to sue exists, the danger is present
that persons with a less than worthy claim will abuse the judicial process.
Certainly the pendency of a lawsuit with the attendant imposition of liberal
discovery of documents and depositions of corporate officers provided for
under the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may frustrate and delay the
normal course of business activity of defendants, as the majority suggested.
The inconvenience may, in fact, press a defendant into a pretrial settlement
of a spurious claim. However, these problems are no different from those
faced by any corporation engaged in litigation. Similarly, regarding the
question of speculative damages, it is true that when there has been neither
the purchase nor sale of securities, determining the damages suffered by a
would-be investor might be extremely difficult. However, as the majority
admits, even though a determination of damages may prove difficult, it has
not precluded a defrauded investor from recovery if his losses are based on
a demonstrable number of shares traded.80 Whether or not a plaintiff can
prove he has been so injured is a question for the jury to determine, and
the fact that the jury's verdict may eventually hinge on purely conflicting oral
testimony, as feared by the Court, is no different from the situation faced
by most litigants.
The majority's narrow reading of section 10(b) and rule lob-5 stands in
marked contrast to that of the dissent, which views the securities laws of
1933 and 1934 as broad proscriptions against all forms of fraud in the
marketplace. Reviewing the same legislative history found to be inconclu-
sive by the majority, the dissent noted that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
specifically direct attention to the question of whether "fraud was employed
. . .by 'any person . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.' ,sl The dissenters thus adopted the Eason investor injury ap-
proach, which provides that as long as the plaintiff can show a logical nexus
between the alleged fraud and the sale or purchase of a security he shall not
automatically be barred from the courtroom, but rather, shall have the
burden of proving the substantive elements of a 10b-5 action. In evaluating
80. Id. at 734, citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155
(1970).
This is in keeping with the Court's policy of permitting actual shareholders to bring
suit when they allege that they failed to sell their shares because of a material misrep-
resentation on the part of the issuer. Likewise, the Court permits shareholders, credi-
tors, and others, who suffered demonstrable loss in their investment due to insider infor-
mation in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, to bring suit. In both cases,
nonpurchasers and nonsellers are permitted to sue under rule lOb-5 in a derivative action
on behalf of the corporate issuer. The possibility of speculative damages has not been
considered a valid reason for barring plaintiffs from seeking relief.
81. Id. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
the policy considerations relied upon by the majority, the dissent disapprov-
ingly noted that the Court "exhibit[ed] a preternatural solicitousness for
corporate well-being and a seeming callousness toward the investing public
quite out of keeping . . .with our own traditions and the intent of the
securities laws."'8 2 Nevertheless, in rejecting the Eason nexus approach, the
majority arbitrarily denied standing to investors who are not purchasers or
sellers of securities but who might prove, if given the opportunity, that they
suffered demonstrable loss because of alleged fraudulent statements on the
part of corporate officers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Blue Chip is important not only because the Supreme Court has finally
decided the viability of the Birnbaum doctrine, but also because of the tone
which the Court employed in so doing. Conceivably, Blue Chip may be
nothing more than an effort to establish an objective standing test by which
the plaintiff class in 10b-5 actions may be limited and the already volumi-
nous litigation under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 may be discouraged.
However, by failing to adopt an Eason-like approach to standing, the Court
in Blue Chip strongly suggests that it is making a deliberate attempt to pull
back from the broad readings which lower courts have given to its decision in
Bankers Life.
It is too early to ascertain what impact Blue Chip will have on the
numerous "exceptions" courts have hitherto found when applying the Birn-
baum doctrine.83  Since Blue Chip affirmed the Birnbaum doctrine only in
the context of an action for money damages, the question remains as to its
applicability in cases calling for purely private-party injunctive relief.8 4
82. Id. at 762, citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
Moreover, the dissent forebodingly commented that the use of such policy considera-
tions may set a dangerous precedent. Id. at 771. Lastly, like the Eason court, the
dissent affirmed its confidence in the ability of the federal courts "to protect the worthy
and shut out the frivolous." Id.
83. In all probability, the courts will take their cue from the literal language of the
opinion and will demand that there be an actual purchase or sale of securities in which
the plaintiff is directly involved. Thus, a trustee in bankruptcy who has neither pur-
chased nor sold securities may no longer bring suit for an alleged lob-5 violation. Com-
pare Thomas v. Roblin Indus. Inc., [1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,259 (3rd Cir. 1975), with Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir.
1971). Cf. Madison Fund, Inc. v. The Charter Co., [1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 95,295 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
84. The Court noted that it has previously held that the purchaser-seller rule does
not limit the right of the SEC to seek injunctive relief. 421 U.S. at 751 n.14, citing
SEC v. National See. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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Moreover, the fact that the Court specifically held that the consent decree
did not create a contractual relationship between the parties indicates that at
least the aborted seller exception to Birnbaum may still be valid even though
there is no actual puchase or sale.
8 5
Nevertheless, Blue Chip appears to be an omen of future action by the
Court to limit the scope and application of other securities laws. The
Court's concern for protecting corporate well-being from vexatious litigation,
as well as its lack of confidence in the adequacy of the jury system, are
concerns easily transferred to private enforcement of the securities laws
generally. The effect of Blue Chip on implied private actions under other
provisions of the federal securities laws remains unclear, but the language
and tone of Blue Chip leave little doubt that, when given the opportunity,
the Court will take a restrictive view of such provisions.8"
Carol Berlin Manzoni
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING-STANDING TO SUE-Excluded
Plaintiffs Must Focus Their Complaint on Specific Disputed
Housing Project Demonstrably Within Their Means to Establish
Standing in Federal Court. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975).
The United States Supreme Court, in its first case involving alleged
"exclusionary zoning,"' handed down a decision which effectively denies
85. It is important to note that the Court specifically stated that section 3(a) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a), grants the status of "purchasers" and "sellers" to holders
of puts, calls, options and other contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities.
These persons, therefore, automatically meet the standing requirement of the Birnbaum
rule. 421 U.S. at 750-51. But see Gauer v. Genesco, Inc., [1975 Transfer Binder] CCII
FED. SEc. L. REP. 95,344 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (purchaser-seller status extended to those
holding a contractual right to buy or sell; however, right to join one's shares with those
of issuer, to "come along", may not be equated with a right to sell).
86. At least one lower court has already extended the Blue Chip rationale to other
provisions of the 1934 Act. In Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises Inc.,
[1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court
held that the implied private right of action under section 13(d) of the 1934 Act would
extend only to actual purchasers or sellers of securities. Explaining its decision, the
court stated "such a holding would seem to follow logically [from Blue Chip]." Id. at
98,466.
1. Exclusionary zoning is a general term for zoning practices that have the effect
of excluding low and moderate income groups from the zoned area. See Moskowitz,
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federal court access to numerous potential plaintiffs in such actions. In
Warth v. Seldin,2 a divided Court held that nonresident plaintiffs repre-
senting low and moderate income groups allegedly excluded by a challenged
ordinance will not be allowed standing to sue in federal court unless they can
focus their suit on a specific excluded housing project which is viable and
which they affirmatively show to be within their financial means.
In 1972, the plaintiffs, individuals of low and moderate incomes3 residing
in the metropolitan area of Rochester, New York, along with individuals and
organizations representing a wide variety of separate and distinct interests, 4
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the suburban
town of Penfield and members of its zoning, planning, and town boards. 5
They claimed that the town's zoning ordinance, as written and as enforced,
made it unfeasible to build low-cost single or multiple family dwellings in
Penfield.6 Thus, they argued, Penfield's zoning practices effectively exclud-
ed the plaintiffs and others similarly situated in violation of their first, ninth
and fourteenth amendment rights and of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
Standing of Future Residents in Exclusionary Zoning Cases, 6 AKRON L. REv. 189
(1973). Among the various zoning "devices" that can have an exclusionary effect are
minimum lot sizes, minimum house sizes, prohibitions against multifamily dwellings or
attached housing, and the discretionary power of the zoning authority to grant special
exceptions. Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use
Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. RV. 509, 520-22 (1971).
2. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Warth is only the second zoning decision issued by the
Court since 1928. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), it upheld
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance which prohibited more than two unmarried
persons from residing in the same dwelling.
3. These plaintiffs were also members of racial and ethnic minorities. 422 U.S. at
493 n.1.
4. Other original plaintiffs, none of whom were accorded standing at any level of
the proceedings, included Rochester property owner-taxpayers and Metro-Act of Ro-
chester, a not-for-profit corporation concerned with the housing shortage. The taxpayer
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant town of Penfield's exclusionary practices forced Ro-
chester to provide a disproportionate share of low income housing, thereby raising the
city property taxes to the plaintiffs' financial detriment. 422 U.S. at 508-09. Metro-
Act asserted standing on behalf of its membership of excluded low and moderate income
persons, Rochester taxpayers, and residents of Penfield deprived of the opportunity to
reside in an integrated community. Id. at 512.
5. The plaintiffs also asked for an award of $750,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at 496.
6. The ordinance was claimed to be exclusionary on its face in that it set allegedly
unreasonable lot size, setback, and floor area requirements for single family housing; set
low density requirements for multifamily housing; and allocated only 0.3 percent of res-
idential property for multifamily structures. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that pro-
posals for low-cost housing were inordinately delayed and arbitrarily denied and that the
town neglected to provide adequate support services for such housing. Id. at 495.
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1871.7 None of these plaintiffs alleged a current legal or equitable interest
in property within Penfield, nor did they claim to have made specific
attempts to obtain a 'building permit, variance, or rezoning of a particular
site. They did produce evidence of such attempts by third parties, how-
evers and attempted to join as parties plaintiff associations representing
builders and developers whose attempts to develop low-cost housing in
Penfield allegedly had been thwarted. 9 The plaintiffs asked that the existing
ordinance be declared unconstitutional and that Penfield be ordered to enact
a new ordinance aimed at rectifying its past discriminatory actions. 10
Faced with this extraordinary array of plaintiffs, the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the action for want of
standing and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 1
The Second Circuit affirmed on the basis of lack of standing, finding as to the
low income plaintiffs that the failure to focus on a particular housing project
deprived their claim of the required "concrete adverseness. ' '12 The builders'
associations received similar treatment, having failed to cite specific actions
taken by the town which had injured their members.
1 3
On June 25, 1975, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Powell, the
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the low and moderate income plain-
tiffs had failed to demonstrate that their inability to find housing in Penfield
had been caused by the town's zoning practices.' 4  The crucial missing link
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (equal rights under the law); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)
(property rights of citizens); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (civil action for deprivation of
constitutional rights by state officials). The plaintiffs claimed infringement of their
constitutional rights to travel, to assemble peaceably, and to enjoy equal protection of
the laws. Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187, 1190 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1974).
8. The record revealed that several multifamily projects had been proposed and re-
jected. Apparently only two of these were specifically alleged to have been intended for
use by persons of low and moderate incomes. 422 U.S. at 505-06 n.15; 495 F.2d at
1189.
9. The original plaintiffs attempted to join Housing Council in the Monroe County
Area, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation representing groups trying to develop low and
moderate cost housing in the Rochester vicinity. One of its members, Penfield Better
Homes, had applied for and been denied a zoning variance to build low and moderate
cost housing in Penfield in 1969. Rochester Home Builders Association, representing
its membership of local builders and claiming lost profits on their behalf, tried to inter-
vene. 422 U.S. at 497.
10. 495 F.2d at 1190.
11. Warth v. Seldin, Civil No. 72-42 (W.D.N.Y., Dec. 29, 1972).
12. 495 F.2d at 1192. The phrase is taken from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
and reads more fully as "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitu-
tional questions." Id. at 204.
13. 495 F.2d at 1195. The court did imply that Penfield Better Homes would have
met with more success by suing in its own behalf. See 45 F.2d at 1194.
14. 422 U.S. at 504-07.
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in the chain of causation was a showing that the plaintiffs could have
afforded to live in the housing projects which had been rejected by the
Penfield Planning Board.' 5 Absent such a demonstration, said the majority,
the court's intervention is unwarranted and it is impossible to frame appro-
priately narrow relief. The builders' claim of standing, moreover, failed for
want of a controversy over a specific project viable at the time the complaint
was filed.'
Justice Brennan, joined in his dissent by Justices White and Marshall,
expressed indignation that the majority had "turn[ed] the very success of
the allegedly unconstitutional scheme into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its
invalidation." 7 Recognizing that a "pattern-and-practice claim is at the
heart of the controversy,"' 8 he specifically would have granted standing to
both the low income plaintiffs and the builders' associations, since their
allegations were sufficient to clear the threshold standing hurdle in such a
claim.' 9
Warth is one of a number of exclusionary zoning challenges that has been
heard in the federal courts in recent years and is the first such suit to reach
the Supreme Court. Although the standing of the plaintiffs rather than the
merits of their claim was at issue, the case may be expected to have a
significant impact on exclusionary zoning litigation. This article will exam-
ine Warth's potential impact and will focus particularly on the role of the
"excluded plaintiff," a person of low or moderate income unable to find hous-
ing in the zoned area.
I. ZONING CHALLENGES AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
EXCLUDED PLAINTIFF
Fifty years ago, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,20 the Su-
preme Court manifested a judicial deference to the wisdom of local zoning
15. Id. at 505-06.
16. In addition, the taxpayer plaintiffs were denied standing on the grounds that any
increased taxes would be the result of decisions by the Rochester taxing authority rather
than by Penfield's zoning board. The standing claims of Metro-Act suffered from the
same defects as those of its individual members. To the extent that Metro-Act repre-
sented residents of Penfield deprived of an integrated environment, the Court chose to
exercise its discretionary power to refuse standing to those attempting to raise the rights
of third parties. Id. at 514.
17. Id. at 523 (Brennan, Marshall, White, JJ., dissenting).
18. Id. at 530.
19. Justice Douglas, dissenting separately, would have granted standing to the asso-
ciational plaintiffs to the extent that they represented "-the communal feeling of the ac-
tual residents." Id. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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authorities that has been adhered to in state and federal courts ever since. 21
The strong presumption of validity accorded zoning decisions, which stems
from their source in the police power,22 creates a "formidable obstacle" 23
to due process attacks. The issue in such a case, as formulated in Euclid, is
whether the practices complained of "are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare."' 24 If the validity of the ordinance or decision is even "fairly
21. See, e.g., Blackman v. City of Big Sandy, 507 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1975) (due
process challenge dismissed for want of substantial federal question); Golden v. Plan-
ning Bd. (Ramapo), 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) ("phased growth" restrictions on development of property
not unconstitutional). See generally 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcTCE § 2-23
(3d ed. 1965); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 782-85 (1969).
22. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926). Because
a municipality has no "inherent police power," I E. YOKLEY, supra note 21, § 2-5,
it must derive its power to zone from a provision of the state constitution or state en-
abling legislation specifically authorizing zoning. See, e.g., Bisson v. Town of Milford,
109 N.H. 287, 249 A.2d 688 (1969). Most state enabling acts are modeled largely on
the STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev. ed. 1926),
reprinted in 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 26.01 (1968).
23. Flippen, Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances Which Exclude Mobile Homes,
12 AM. Bus. L.J. 15, 18 (1974).
24. 272 U.S. at 395. This "rational basis" test was recently applied by the Court
in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (challenge to zoning on due proc-
ess and other grounds). The burden of showing that the zoning authority had no ra-
tional basis for making a particular zoning decision is made heavier by the authority's
virtual immunity from questioning as to its motive. See City of Fairfield v. Superior
Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 537 P.2d 375, 122 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1975) (application in zoning
context of United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), which held that official per-
forming administrative function cannot be examined as to the process by which his con-
clusions were reached).
In the context of exclusionary zoning, the plaintiff's burden would seem to be consid-
erably lightened in the few states that have adopted the view that the "general welfare"
to be considered by the zoning authority encompasses that of communities outside the
zoned area. A leading case espousing this "regional interests" doctrine is Southern Bur-
lington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713
(1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1975). In Mount Laurel,
the New Jersey Supreme Court found that under the "general welfare" provision of the
state constitution, the zoning authority had an affirmative obligation to consider the
housing needs of the surrounding region and its failure to do so rendered the exclusion-
ary provisions of the zoning ordinance presumptively invalid. See also Appeal of Kit-
Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (two and three acre minimum
lot sizes unconstitutional). Several authorities have suggested that a judicial regional
approach would facilitate successful due process attacks. See, e.g., Marcus, Exclusionary
Zoning: The Need for a Regional Planning Context, 16 N.Y.L.F. 732 (1970); Sager,
supra note 21, at 793. Others, however, believe that a regional approach would have
precisely the opposite effect. See Burchell, Litoskin & James, Exclusionary Zoning: Pit-
falls of the Regional Remedy, 7 THE URBAN LAWYER 262 (1975). The Ninth Circuit
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debatable," it will be upheld. 25 Nevertheless, zoning challenges traditionally
have been grounded in due process, and occasionally a plaintiff will sustain
his burden of showing that the zoning regulation or practice is arbitrary and
capricious.
26
Essential to the classic due process attack is the classic plaintiff, one with a
proprietary interest claimed to be injured by the zoning practice. 27  Gener-
ally, but with at least one notable exception, 28 state courts, which are the
traditional forum for zoning suits, have restricted standing to persons having
at the minimum a pecuniary interest, and usually a proprietary interest in
zoned land which is demonstrably affected by a specific challenged zoning
decision.
29
A concurrent thread in the history of zoning challenges is found in the
consistent invalidation of ordinances which patently exclude racial minori-
ties.30  As long ago as 1917, in Buchanan v. Warley,31 the Supreme Court
struck down a Louisville, Kentucky ordinance which prohibited whites or
blacks from moving into property on blocks predominantly inhabited by
members of the opposite race. While the Court's language made it clear
that the abhorrent feature of the ordinance was the infringement on the
rights of the excluded black person, 32 the plaintiff was in fact a white
property owner and the sole ground for standing was the injury to his
property rights. This circuitous means of providing equal protection for
has specifically declined to adopt the regional approach in a due process context. Con-
struction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
25. Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927).
26. See, e.g., Oak Forest Mobile Homes Park, Inc. v. City of Oak Forest, 27 I11. App.
3d 303, 326 N.E.2d 473 (1975) (ordinance banning mobile homes invalid); Board of
Supervisors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d 33 (1975) (denial of rezoning to
higher density use held arbitrary and capricious).
27. See generally 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 22, §§ 21.05-.07.
28. See Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1975)
(interpreting New Jersey statute to grant standing to nonresidents desiring to live in the
zoned area).
29. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 22, §§ 21.05-.07. Many state enabling statutes
have adopted the approach of the STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note
22, which grants standing to "[a]ny person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved"
by a decision of the zoning authority. Id. § 7. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-8
(Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-706 (1973). Clearly this broad terminology leaves
the substantive rules of standing largely within the discretion of the courts. Cf. A
MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 9-103 to -04 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1975).
30. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 A. 910 (1918) (ordinance forbid-
ding blacks to live on all-white blocks violates due process).
31. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
32. Id. at 76, 77, 79.
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racial minorities by invoking the due process rights of third parties was for
years the prime method of attack on racially discriminatory zoning ordi-
nances.
33
In contrast, the invalidation of certain zoning practices which, while not
directly racially discriminatory, exclude low and moderate income groups
from the zoned area, is largely a development of the last decade.3 4 As the
phrase implies, the focus of exclusionary zoning suits is on the rights of the
excluded persons, and a host of innovative constitutional and statutory
theories have been invoked in their behalf.35  Supporters of these zoning
challenges have emphasized the importance of the equal protection clause
with its attendant possibilities for a stricter standard of review36 than is
afforded by the traditional Euclid due process analysis.37  Accordingly, they
have argued that housing is a fundamental right38 and that the poor constitute
a suspect class.3 9 Alternatively, they have attempted to bring the excluded
low and moderate income groups within the strict scrutiny cloak applicable to
racial minorities by demonstrating a high statistical incidence of racial and
ethnic minorities within the excluded economic class. 40
The equal protection attacks on exclusionary zoning have met with a
certain degree of success in the lower federal courts, although it appears that
in nearly every case there has been a showing of racial discrimination to
33. See, e.g., Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem, 217 N.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 867 (1940);
City of Dallas v. Liberty Annex Corp., 19 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
34. For a list of articles on the subject of exclusionary zoning in addition to those
cited herein, see Willistown Township v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Cmwlth. 453,
463-64, 300 A.2d 107, 112-13 nn. 3 & 4 (1973).
35. See generally Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary Zoning: The Second
Generation Cases and the Environment, 6 Sw. L. REv. 88, 111-22 (1974) (right to
travel, right to privacy, right of assembly).
36. See Flippen, supra note 23, at 22; Sager, supra note 21, at 798-800.
37. As was illustrated in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the
"rational basis" test is also applied in equal protection claims, if no fundamental right
or suspect classification is involved.
38. See Flippen, supra note 23, at 23-25.
39. See Sager, supra note 21, at 785-87.
40. Although courts have repeatedly stated that a mere statistical correlation is insuf-
ficient to transform an economic classification into a racial one, e.g., Metropolitan Hous-
ing Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 560 (1975); Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d
250, 253 (9th Cir. 1974); English v. Town of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir.
1971), an apparent shifting of emphasis in the racial discrimination cases from motive
to effect, see Metropolitan Housing Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, supra; United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975), provides the advocate with a convenient sleight of hand to reach the same result.
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
trigger the "strict scrutiny" analysis. 41 Whether the discrimination is felt to
be economic or racial, however, the decisions more clearly than ever before
focus on the inability of the excluded persons to find housing within the
zoned area and the attendant infringement on their constitutional rights.
42
Although there has almost invariably been a specific disputed housing
project at the core of the lawsuit, the plaintiffs have often tried to establish
evidence of a pattern and practice of exclusionary zoning. The courts have
looked to the past practices of the municipality, the unavailability of housing
in the surrounding areas, the existing racial and economic mix of the zoned
area and its environs, and the predictive future effect of the court's failure to
grant the requested relief. 43  As a consequence, the relief granted has on
occasion gone well beyond the particular project that initiated the dispute
and has assumed the nature of a judicial command that the municipality
affirmatively undertake to rectify past discrimination.
44
The focus on the excluded persons' rights has been facilitated by the
advocates' creative joinder of parties. In most cases there has been at
least one plaintiff who fit within the traditional zoning-standing conceptual
mold,45 commonly a nonprofit corporation that has been formed for the
specific purpose of developing low-cost housing, has obtained an option
40 or
contract 47 to purchase a site for such development, and has requested and
41. See, e.g., Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 560 (1975) (refusal by white suburb of
Chicago to rezone for low and moderate income housing violates equal protection).
42. See Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.
1972); Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp.
396 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
43. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
44. See Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 357
F. Supp. 1188, 1199-1200 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970) (city ordered
to encourage, and implement if possible, various means of providing low-cost housing
within specified time period); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
a/f'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (county ordered to study area housing prob-
lems and to take steps "toward full compliance with the national housing policy of bal-
anced and dispersed public housing." 332 F. Supp. at 395). Cf. United Farmworkers
of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974)
(order to issue sewer permit); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970) (order to rezone tract of land). This "single development decisionmaking" has
been criticized as not addressing the real problem. See Moskowitz, supra note 1, at
209-14.
45. See notes 27-29 & accompanying text supra.
46. See, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union
City, 357 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal.), a/I'd, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
47. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). The owner of the property, who unde-
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been denied the cooperation of the zoning authority.48 Occasionally, a
builders' association has been joined, claiming lost profits on behalf of its
members and lost dues and membership on its own behalf. 49  Almost
universally present, however, is the excluded plaintiff, a person of low or
moderate income, often a member of a racial or ethnic minority, claiming
injury by virtue of his inability to find satisfactory housing within the
political subdivision. 50 He is a named party to the suit, often on behalf of
his excluded class, and his interests are occasionally represented as well by a
civic organization."1  He clearly lacks the classic "proprietary interest"
which traditionally has been required; thus he has been a key figure in a new
generation of standing cases.
52
The excluded plaintiff has met with remarkable success in gaining access
to the lower federal courts. Most of the opinions do not devote extensive
analysis to the issue. The standing of the excluded party is occasionally
assumed without discussion or is rather peremptorily affirmed.5 3 In Park
View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 4 however, the Eighth Circuit
niably has standing, is occasionally joined as well. See, e.g., Sisters of Providence of
St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
48. See, e.g., Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a! 'd, 457 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusal to issue building permit); Sisters of Providence of St. Mary
of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (refusal to rezone
to higher density use).
49. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975).
50. See cases cited notes 41-44 supra.
51. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
52. See cases cited note 42 supra. The doctrine of standing in the federal courts
springs from two sources. The Constitution limits the power of those courts to the con-
sideration of an actual "case or controversy." U.S. CONST. art. III. Generally, this
mandate is interpreted to require that the plaintiff show "injury in fact." Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-54 (1970).
Second, the Supreme Court, for prudential reasons, has created certain rules under
which it limits itself and the lower federal courts in the exercise of jurisdiction.
E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1953). The most important of these,
for purposes of this article, is the refusal, except under certain defined circumstances,
to allow parties to raise the rights of third parties to protect themselves against a par-
ticular injury. E.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). Exceptional circum-
stances include situations in which the third parties are unable to defend their own inter-
ests, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and in which there is an existing relation-
ship between the parties adversely affected by the challenged action. E.g., Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
53. See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), af 'd, 436 F.2d
108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp.
382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
54. 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
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discussed at length the standing claims of a fairly representative array of
plaintiffs. The reasoning of that opinion may well indicate the unspoken
rationale of the other federal courts in similar exclusionary zoning cases.
The plaintiffs in Park View Heights were nonprofit corporations and eight
individuals of low and moderate incomes desiring to live in the zoned area.
One of the corporations, Inter-Religious Center for Urban Affairs, Inc., an
organization interested in urban problems, had expended time and seed
money on a low-cost housing project to be built in the zoned area; Park
View Heights Corporation had been formed to manage the project and held
title to the proposed site. The district court had dismissed as to all plaintiffs
except Park View Heights, which was to be allowed to litigate only its due
process claim. 55 Reversing and reinstating all the plaintiffs, the appeals
court held that each had a judicially cognizable injury and that the two
corporations could litigate the constitutional and statutory claims of the
individual plaintiffs. In discussing the equal protection claim, the court
emphasized that "[t]he interests of the corporate and individual plaintiffs
coincide because both desire to be free from the discriminatory zoning." 56
The court characterized the interest of the corporate plaintiffs as a desire to
build "racially integrated rental housing in a better economic, educational,
and recreational environment. '57 Thus, the corporations were not forced to
overcome the Euclid "rational basis" hurdle, and the exclusion of the low
income groups assumed the central role in the lawsuit.
Since it is the rights of the excluded plaintiffs which are "most seriously at
stake,"58 observers have urged that they be granted standing irrespective of
any existing property interest in the zoned area. 59 Until Warth, however,
the excluded plaintiff has been coupled with a traditional "proprietary
interest" plaintiff, and the charge of a pattern and practice of exclusionary
zoning has usually had a specific disputed housing project at its core.60
55. 335 F. Supp. 899, 904 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
56. 467 F.2d at 1213.
57. Id. at 1214.
58. Moskowitz, supra note 1, at 208.
59. See Aloi, supra note 35; Moskowitz, supra note 1; Note, Towards Liberalized Re-
quirements for Standing in Zoning Litigation: Approximation of the Public Welfare, 5
MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 251 (1975).
60. But see Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1975) (attack on a newly passed ordinance alleged to be exclusionary on
its face); Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895
(N.D. Cal. 1971) (plaintiffs' option to purchase a tract of land for development of low-
cost housing had expired but they claimed a continuing intent to pursue such projects).
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II. Warth: THE SUPREME COURT DRAWS THE LINE
In Warth, the Supreme Court was asked both to approve and to extend
the evolving standing principles found in the lower federal court exclusionary
zoning cases. While Warth was clearly in the genre of Park View Heights
and the other exclusionary zoning cases, the suit was atypical in two
important ways. First, although specific housing projects were mentioned
both in the pleadings and in the record, they were there only for the purpose
of illustrating the overall pattern and practice of discrimination. 61  The
plaintiffs alleged a purposeful continuing policy of exclusion by the town of
Penfield and asked that an injunction be issued requiring the town to draw
up a new ordinance which would mitigate the effects of its past discrimina-
tion. Thus, there was no focus on a particular project and no request that a
particular action of the zoning body be declared invalid.
62
Second, the independent standing of the excluded plaintiffs was put to a
crucial test. None of the co-plaintiffs alleged the kind of proprietary interest
which had been the keystone of previous litigation; the excluded plaintiffs in
Warth would not be able to attain standing on the strength of another party's
interest. The low income and minority group plaintiffs were at center stage
in Warth and their standing allegations would have to succeed or fail on their
own merits.
A. The Failure to Focus on a Specific Project
The failure to focus on a particular housing project was fatal to the
standing claims of the excluded plaintiffs. 63 The majority objected to the
plaintiffs' failure to allege that they could have afforded to live in the specific
projects referred to in the record.6 4 Because of that omission, the majority
61. Although the plaintiffs did allege that the Penfield ordinance was unconstitu-
tional on its face, their claim focused on the pattern of denied variances and building
permits. See 422 U.S. at 522 (Brennan, Marshall, White, JJ., dissenting).
62. Cf. authorities cited note 44 supra.
63. 422 U.S. at 503-07. The lack of a focal housing project was also fatal to the
builders associations' claims; the Court held that they had failed to show injury of "suf-
ficient immediacy and ripeness to warrant judicial intervention." Id. at 516. The other
plaintiffs' claims were also struck down, but for different reasons. See note 16 supra.
64. The majority chose not to infer that the excluded plaintiffs could have afforded
to live in the rejected projects despite the plaintiffs' claim that they were persons of low
and moderate incomes and that the projects were intended for use by persons in that
category. 422 U.S. at 506-07 n.16. Although the record revealed in dollar figures
the incomes and budgets of the plaintiffs as well as the projected unit costs for at least
one of the housing projects, the majority and three of the dissenters reached opposite
conclusions as to whether the plaintiffs had thereby shown that they could afford to live
in the projects. See id. at 527-28 n.7 (Brennan, Marshall, White, IJ., dissenting). Justice
Douglas suggested that "the Court reads the complaint and the record with antagonistic
eyes." Id. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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felt that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any direct injury caused by
the complained of zoning practices. The dissenters recognized, however,
that the thrust of the Warth complaint was not that a specific housing project
had been rejected, but that the town's practices effectively excluded all such
projects.65  Justice Brennan, dissenting, felt that the pleadings and the
record painted a portrait of "total, purposeful, intransigent exclusion of
certain classes of people -from the town, pursuant to a conscious scheme
never deviated from."06  Thus, implicit in the majority's requirement of
specificity is a rejection of the pure "pattern and practice" lawsuit in the
context of economic exclusionary zoning.
There is discernible in the majority opinion a concern over the problem of
framing appropriate relief in a suit which focuses on no particular housing
development. The excluded plaintiff is asked to demonstrate "that he
personally would benefit in a tangible way from the courts' intervention" and
that "relief can be framed 'no broader than required by the precise facts to
which the court's ruling would be applied.' "67 It would appear that the
broad affirmative relief granted by lower federal courts on at least two
occasions is no longer a viable remedy after Warth. Rather, the opinion
implies that the most a plaintiff can ask of a federal court is that it remove
whatever stumbling blocks the zoning authority has placed in the way of a
particular project.68
B. The Independent Standing of the Excluded Plaintiff
The excluded plaintiff did win one small victory in Warth. The Court
recognized that, "in a proper case,"69 a low income or minority group party
has standing to challenge an exclusionary zoning action. 70  Although the
excluded plaintiff commonly has been a party in federal court zoning
challenges, his position has been a tenuous one.71 It would seem, however,
65. Id. at 522-23 (Brennan, Marshall, White, JJ., dissenting).
66. Id. at 523. Although the majority opined that the real villain was "the economics
of the area housing market," id. at 506, it did not refute Justice Brennan's reading
of the complaint.
67. Id. at 508, quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 221-22 (1974).
68. Cf. cases cited note 44 supra.
69. 422 U.S. at 510.
70. One need not allege a contractual interest in the focal housing project. id.
at 508 n.18.
71. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, when it considered
Warth, declined to decide whether the plaintiffs' personal lack of interest in land was
alone sufficient to defeat the standing claims of the excluded parties. 495 F.2d at 1192.
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that after Warth, the excluded plaintiff no longer needs to employ the "sham"
of joining with a plaintiff who fulfills the traditional "proprietary interest"
requirement. 7
2
The Court considered each category of plaintiff as an independent entity,
focusing in each instance on the particular injury alleged and the particular
constitutional or statutory protection available to that party. This rigorous
method of analysis is in dramatic contrast to the Park View Heights
approach. 73 Under the latter analysis, the courts have recognized a commu-
nity of interwoven interests with the common goal of elimination of illegal
barriers to low-cost housing. Once a plaintiff could demonstrate a personal
injury stemming from the zoning practice, he was able to litigate the claims
of his co-plaintiffs as well, and the standard of judicial review was deter-
mined by the constitutional rights of the excluded group. The Warth Court
made it clear, however, that each plaintiff would have to clear the standing
hurdle on his own. More importantly, it would appear that third parties will
be unable to ralse the claims of the excluded group unless an existing
relationship between them is demonstrably harmed by the challenged
practice. 7
4
Thus, the plaintiff by plaintiff approach in Warth will make it substantial-
ly more difficult for the "proprietary interest" plaintiff, whose injury is
grounded in due process rights, to trigger the equal protection standard of
review. The excluded plaintiff is no longer relegated to a secondary role in
these lawsuits; in fact, his presence may well be essential to a successful
zoning attack. This long overdue recognition of the excluded plaintiff's
central role in exclusionary zoning challenges is a mixed blessing, however, if
others who are economically motivated and better able to institute a lawsuit
can no longer raise his constitutional rights.
72. MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. Note, supra note 59, at 264. See also Moskowitz, supra
note 1, at 190-98.
73. See notes 55-59 & accompanying text supra.
74. The Rochester taxpayers and Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc. were both specifically
denied standing to litigate the claims of the excluded group. The Court noted that no
relationship between the parties was alleged to be damaged and that the excluded group
could assert its own rights in a proper case. 422 U.S. at 514 n.22. See note 52 supra.
A contractual connection, a classic focal point in racial zoning suits, see Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), would be the clearest example of such a relationship.
In Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
the court held that, in light of Warth, landowners and builders' associations could
not litigate the "-right to travel" claim of the excluded group. Since there were
no representatives of the excluded class in the suit, the court applied a "rational basis"
test and reversed the trial court's invalidation of the exclusionary aspects of the chal-
lenged ordinance.
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C. Practical Considerations
For the excluded plaintiff considering a lawsuit in federal court, the
mandate of Warth is clear: the suit must focus on a particular housing
project. 75 The project should be viable at the outset of the lawsuit and it
must be one in which the named plaintiffs intend to and can afford to live.
As a practical matter, this requirement will necessitate the cooperation of a
builder or developer ready to invest time and money in a speculative cause
and willing as well to risk retaliatory moves by the local housing authority.
76
The nonprofit corporation created for the specific purpose of developing low-
cost housing is still a viable tactic, although the expense of the undertaking
has undone at least one such venture. 77  Moreover, the excluded plaintiff
would be well advised to join the developer as co-plaintiff lest the action be
dismissed for failure to show the continuing intent of the developer to
proceed with the project.
78
It should be noted that there may still be certain exceptions to the
requirement of a focal housing project. First, a pure "pattern and practice"
claim alleging purposeful racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act
79
75. Arguably, the focal housing project is not a sine qua non:
A particularized personal interest may be shown in various ways which we
need not undertake to identify in the abstract. But usually the initial focus
should be on a particular project.
422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
76. The builders' association in Warth was threatened with retaliation against its
members. 422 U.S. at 497 n.7.
77. See Margolis, Exclusionary Zoning: For Whom Does Belle Terre Toll?, 11 CALIF.
W.L. REV. 84 (1974). The author indicates that the plaintiffs in Sisters of Provi-
dence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971),
having won their standing claim, had to abandon their lawsuit and their housing project
for lack of funds.
78. The excluded party might also consider entering into a contractual relationship
with the developer. This would strengthen his claim of "particularized personal inter-
est," 422 U.S. at 508 n.18, and the developer would presumably be able to litigate the
claims of the excluded class. See note 74 & accompanying text supra.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-10 (1970). The Court believed that no such claim was raised
in Warth even by implication. It reasoned that a claim under the Fair Housing Act
would have to allege prosecutorial racial discrimination and that the Warth plaintiffs
claimed only purposeful economic discrimination with the resulting effect of ra-
cial exclusion. 422 U.S. at 513 & n.21. Cf. cases cited note 40 supra.
With respect to the task of showing purposeful racial or economic discrimination, con-
sider the following:
• . . we can comfortably predict that communities will find increasingly sophis-
ticated means of obscuring racial motivation in the context of land use deci-
sions. Concern for the environment presents a rationale as broad as all out-
doors for nearly any specific governmental choice. The pants-down vaudeville
of the city of Lackawanna or Fulton County losing parties in prior exclu-
sionary zoning suits] will soon be a thing of the past.
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is not altogether precluded by Warth. The potential of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 197480 should be explored by potential
litigants faced with the standing problem. Furthermore, it may still be
possible to challenge an ordinance as exclusionary on its face without having
to cite the rejection of a particular project, 81 since the claims in Warth rested
largely on the manner in which the Penfield zoning authority exercised its
discretionary functions. Most important, however, is the fact that standing




The archetype of the successful standing claim outlined in the preceding
section is a familiar one. Most of the exclusionary zoning challenges in
federal courts in recent years have fit that model. Thus, strictly speaking,
Warth does not overrule the standing aspects of those cases. Yet the
decision does seem calculated to put a halt to the increasing receptivity in
lower federal courts to such lawsuits. Just how far this policy of reluctance
will erode the gains already made by exclusionary zoning litigants remains to
Sager, Troubled Waters: Litigation in the Federal Courts Against Exclusionary Land
Use Restraints, in Nat'l Comm. Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc., Exclusionary
Land Use Litigation Policy and Strategy for the Future (papers presented at NCDH-
Potomac Institute Exclusionary Land Use Litigation Conference, November 1974).
80. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301-17 (Supp. 1975). The Act regulates the disbursement of
federal funds for local use in community development. For a consideration of the Act's
potential impact on standing in exclusionary zoning litigation, see Franklin, Open Com-
munities Litigation and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, in Nat'l
Comm. Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc., supra note 79.
81. See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), discussed note 74 supra. The Petaluma court, familiar with the princi-
ples enunciated in Warth, recognized the standing of landowners and builders to chal-
lenge a recently enacted ordinance restricting growth. It has been suggested that such
"per se challenges" will rarely succeed. Sager, supra note 79, at 27-30.
82. New Jersey has statutorily bestowed standing on "any person, whether residing
within or without the municipality, whose right to use, acquire, or enjoy property is or
may be effected [sic] by any action taken under [the zoning] act .... " N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55-47.1 (1970). The supreme court of that state has interpreted -the statute to en-
compass excluded plaintiffs having no connection to an existing proprietary interest
within the zoned area. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3074
(U.S. Aug. 8, 1975). The American Law Institute has drafted a model statute with
standing provisions specifically intended to obviate the result reached in Warth. See A
MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 9-104, at 471-73 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1975). For
a study of the receptivity of various states to exclusionary zoning litigation, see Williams,
Anti-Exclusionary Litigation-In What States?, in Nat'l Comm. Against Discrimination
in Housing, Inc., supra note 79.
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be seen. One message is clear: unless the excluded plaintiff can demon-
strate the existence of a live controversy over a specific viable housing
project, he may not look to the federal courts for the vindication of his rights.
Sally M. Armstrong
LABOR LAW-Circuits in Conflict as to Whether an Interim
Bargaining Order Should Issue When There is Reasonable
Cause to Believe an Employer Has Committed Unfair Labor
Practices and an Uncertified Union Has Made a Showing of Ma-
jority Support. Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d
Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3428 (U.S. Jan.
14, 1976) (No. 75-1000); Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,
515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975).
Although the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has been increas-
ingly willing to exercise its discretion to seek temporary injunctive relief
pending final determination of cases involving unfair labor practices, the
parameters for the issuance of interim bargaining orders under section 10(j)
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)I remain unclear. The
unresolved question is whether a section 10(j) bargaining order is proper
interim relief when there is reasonable cause to believe that an employer has
engaged in substantial unfair labor practices and when a union, although not
certified by an NLRB supervised election, claims to have had the support of
a majority of employees as expressed through signed authorization cards.
2
1. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970) provides in relevant part:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint ... charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition
any United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor
practice in question is alleged to have occurred ... for appropriate temporary
relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court...
shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restrain-
ing order as it deems just and proper.
2. The traditional and preferred route to the status of bargaining representative is
through Board certification after an election by secret ballot, under procedures deline-
ated in section 9(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970). Since, however, section
9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), refers to the representative only as one "designated
or selected ... by the majority of the employees ... ," and since section 8(a) (5), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions
of section 159(a) . . . ," other methods of ascertaining the bargaining representative
432 [Vol. 25:417
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In Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc.,3 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that when a regional director of the NLRB makes a
showing, based on authorization cards, that a union had a clear majority
at one time and when the unfair labor practices by the employer are so
substantial as to undermine majority strength and preclude the possibility of
holding a fair election, the district court must issue an interim bargaining
order. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Boire v.
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,4 disagreed, determining that "[a]n interim bargain-
ing order would . . .creat[e] by judicial fiat a relationship that has never
existed." 5  Fearful of making judicial inroads into the NLRB's primary
statutory authority as investigator and adjudicator, the Pilot Freight court
refused to force a bargaining relationship on the basis of still unproved unfair
labor practice charges. In both cases, the courts affirmed lower court
decisions to grant temporary injunctions of a prohibitory nature against the
employers, finding the requisite reasonable cause to believe that violations of
the Act had been committed. The two circuits differed principally on the
use of mandatory injunctive remedies, such as bargaining orders and reinstate-
ment of striking employees. 6
Trading Port, Inc., a wholesale and retail grocery business in Albany, New
York, employed 49 warehousemen, 43 of whom signed authorization cards
designating Local 294 of the Teamsters as their bargaining representative. 7
have not been precluded. Convincing evidence of majority support by the employees
for the union claiming representative status, coupled with employer unfair labor practices
serious enough to impede the election process, has been held to create a duty to bargain.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1969). In these situations, posses-
sion of cards signed by a majority of the employees authorizing the union to represent
them for collective bargaining purposes is an accepted method of proving such support.
3. 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
4. 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3428 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 1976) (No. 75-1000). It is interesting to note that although both cases discuss
similar issues, Pilot Freight makes no mention of the earlier Second Circuit decision in
Trading Port.
5. Id. at 1194.
6. In Trading Port, the employer had complied with the administrative law judge's
decision ordering reinstatement; therefore, that interim remedy was not at issue before
the appeals court. 517 F.2d at 35 n.1. In Pilot Freight, the court based its refusal to
consider the reinstatement issue on the Board's 3-month delay in petitioning for re-
lief. 515 F.2d at 1193. For a discussion of the difference between prohibitory and
mandatory injunctions and their effects, see Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 86
L.R.R.M. 2976 (M.D. Fla. 1974). The issue of whether a higher burden of proof may
be necessary to justify a mandatory injunction is discussed in Roth, Injunctive Relief and
the NLRB, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 353, 388-89 (1969).
7. The administrative law judge found 42 cards to be valid expressions of majority
support. He found that one had been obtained through improper inducements. 517
F.2d at 35 n.2. For a discussion of the Board's rule concerning the validity of cards,
see Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), enforced, 351 F.2d 917 (6th
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After the president of Trading Port refused either to recognize the union or
to allow a neutral third party to verify the union's majority, the warehouse-
men voted to strike. When they returned to work 20 days later, they were
issued lay-off slips. Ten employees were subsequently rehired; 11 had
returned to work during the strike, and 20 were permanently laid off. An
NLRB election held after the strike produced only three votes for the union,
whereupon the union filed objections to the election and charges of unfair
labor practices allegedly occurring before, during and after the strike. While
the hearing on the charges was in progress before an administrative law
judge, the regional director petitioned the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York, under section 10(j), for an order enjoining
Trading Port from engaging in conduct in violation of sections 8(a)(1),
8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 8 and directing the company to
reinstate certain employees and to recognize and bargain with the union
pending final disposition of the unfair labor practice charges.
The district court, finding reasonable cause to believe that Trading Port
had committed section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations, enjoined the em-
ployer9 from further violations of the employees' section 7 rights. 10 The
Cir. 1965). The Cumberland Shoe doctrine was approved in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), in which the court reiterated the rule that
if the card itself is unambiguous (i.e., states on its face that the signer author-
izes the Union to represent the employee for collective bargaining purposes
and not to seek an election), it will be counted unless it is proved that the
employee was told that the card was to be used solely for the purpose of ob-
taining an election.
Id. at 584.
8. Unfair labor practices by employers are enumerated in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)
(1970), which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization ....
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ-
ees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
9. 88 L.R.R.M. 3293 (N.D.N.Y. 1974).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) states in relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities. . ..
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court refused, however, to issue a bargaining order because of the lack of a
previous bargaining relationship. 1
The Second Circuit agreed that there was reasonable cause to order
injunctive relief but ruled further that such relief could also include a
bargaining order. Relying on the landmark Supreme, Court opinion in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 2 which upheld the use of a final bargaining
order when a union claimed only a card majority and when the employer
had committed unfair labor practices deemed substantial enough to impair
the election process, the court in Trading Port held that a cease and desist
order as the sole interim relief would be insufficient, stating that "[o]nly if
the district courts may issue interim bargaining orders can the union's
viability be maintained to the degree necessary to make final Board adjudi-
cation in the form of an election or a bargaining order meaningful.'
3
While the lower court was reluctant to create a new relationship, the
appeals court was concerned about "preserving or restoring the status quo as
it existed before the onset of unfair labor practices. 1' 4  The Second Circuit
considered such an order to be a necessary use of the district court's power to
"prevent irreparable harm to the union's position in the plant, to the
adjudicatory machinery of the NLRB, and to the policy of the Act....
1 5
In this instance, the case was remanded for a determination of whether
the unfair labor practices were so serious as to warrant the issuance of a
11. 88 L.R.R.M. 3293 (N.D.N.Y. 1973). The court agreed with the holding of
Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 385 (D. Mass. 1974), that "petitioner . . .seeks
to create a collective bargaining relation through an injunction. The set of rights and
duties imposed does not exist and cannot be determined to have existed until the Board
resolves the case." Id. at 387. The Board's determination in Steel-Fab, Inc., 216
N.L.R.B. No. 25, 86 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1974), that a final bargaining order applies only
as of the date of the Board's unfair labor practices adjudication, was overruled in Trad-
ing Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 89 L.R.R.M. 1565 (1975), in which the Board
dated the obligation to bargain from the commencement of the unfair labor practices
by the employer. See pp. 443-44 infra.
12. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
13. 517 F.2d at 38. To show congressional support for this interpretation of section
10(j), the opinion also cited S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947), which noted
that
the relatively slow procedure of Board hearing and order ...falls short of
achieving the desired objectives . . . .Hence we have provided that the Board,
acting in the public interest and not in vindication of purely private rights, may
seek injunctive relief. ...
Id. at 8.
14. 517 F.2d at 38 (emphasis in original). The court distinguished the status quo
which should be protected by section 10(j) from what it termed "the illegal status quo
which has come into being as a result of the unfair labor practices being litigated." Id.
15. Id. at 39.
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bargaining order.16
Less than two months later, the Fifth Circuit decided the issue quite
differently in Pilot Freight. After years of litigation, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission in 1970 gave Pilot Freight Carriers an extension of its
freight operations into Florida. Pilot opened four Florida terminals, which
it operated with approximately 140 nonsupervisory personnel. These Florida
employees were not employed directly by Pilot but consisted of owner-oper-
ator truck drivers and dockworkers employed by independent labor contrac-
tors. Since 1964, Pilot had been a party to the National Master Freight
Agreement (NMFA) 17 and all but one of its terminals outside Florida were
represented by the Teamsters Union. When, after substantial arbitration
under the NMFA and investigation by the NLRB, the Board decided in early
1974 that the Florida operation was not an accretion to the preexisting bar-
gaining unit covered by the agreement,' 8 immediate organizing activity by
the Teamsters followed with equally swift responses by Pilot and its dock con-
tractor, BBR of Florida, Inc. By mid-February the union claimed majority
support as evidenced by signed authorization cards, but Pilot refused to recog-
nize the Teamsters as the collective bargaining representative.
The union then filed unfair labor practice charges and the Board peti-
tioned the district court, under section 10(j), to enjoin Pilot and BBR -from
future conduct in violation of the Act, for reinstatement of two employees
allegedly discharged for union activity, and for a temporary bargaining
order. The district court found,19 and the appeals court agreed, 20 that there
was reasonable cause to believe that Pilot and BBR had committed viola-
tions of sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the Act;2' both courts,
however, limited relief to a prohibitory injunction. Consistent with its
position in Boire v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,22 in which
it upheld the district court in issuing a 10(j) injunction to enjoin union
16. Id. at 40. In a footnote, the court instructed the district court to consider the
findings of the administrative law judge, which were not available at the time of the
first trial. Id. n.11.
17. The NMFA is a collective bargaining contract periodically negotiated and re-
newed by the Teamsters Union and a multi-employer association of which Pilot is a
member. At the time of this action, approximately 1,800 Pilot employees were covered
by the NMFA. See Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 782-86 (5th
Cir. 1973), for a more complete treatment of the factual setting of this case.
18. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 85 L.R.R.M. 1179 (1974).
19. 86 L.R.R.M. 2976 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
20. 515 F.2d at 1191.
21. These sections are quoted in note 8 supra.
22. 479 F.2d 778, 789-92 (5th Cir. 1973) (when legal theories are substantial, even




recognitional activity which had occurred before the accretion issue and
unfair labor practice charges had been decided by the NLRB, the Fifth
Circuit showed its concern for protecting the Board's "powers and preroga-
tives."' 23  Since the parties had never entered into a formal bargaining
relationship, the Pilot Freight court held that the status quo which should be
preserved pending a final decision "'is the last uncontested status which pre-
ceded the pending controversy.' "24
Two underlying issues emerge from these cases regarding interim bargain-
ing orders: (1) at what point the status quo that section 10(j) is designed
to protect arises, and (2) the proper role of the courts when asked by the
Board to issue a temporary injunction. This article will focus on these issues
as they relate to the history of labor injunctions and current Board policy.
I. THE LABOR INJUNCTION: AN EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY
As a result of the early abusive use of labor injunctions, Congress
significantly restricted the federal courts' jurisdiction to grant such relief in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 25  Ex parte injunctions were outlawed except as
emergency temporary procedures, and most activities growing out of a labor
dispute were protected from any injunctive action. The view of injunctions
as extraordinary remedies has remained a powerful force against their
overuse.
26
When Congress moved to reintroduce the injunction as interim relief in
sections 10(j) and 10(l) of the Taft-Hartley Amendments,2 7 the proposal
23. 515 F.2d at 1192. The court agreed with the district court that mandatory in-
junctive relief would have the effect of short-circuiting the NLRB's processes.
24. Id. at 1194, quoting Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 273
(8th Cir. 1967).
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
26. Tihe extraordinary remedy of injunction should not and cannot become the
ordinary remedy in unfair labor practice cases. Congress delegated to the
five-man National Labor Relations Board sitting in Washington, and not to the
district courts, the duty to give an expert and experienced content and direction
to the National Labor Relations Act.
McCulloch, New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management Relations
Act: The Taft-Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82, 97 (1962). See also McLeod v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 849-50 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 87 S. Ct. 5 (1966), stay
vacated and remanded, 385 U.S. 533 (1967); Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 385,
387 (D. Mass. 1973).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970) provides that on a finding that certain specified un-
fair labor practices have occurred, a mandatory filing for injunctive relief will follow.
Because it is mandatory and has priority over other procedures, in order to expedite re-
lief section 10(l) has been used much more frequently than section 10(j). See The Role
of the Temporary Injunction in Reforming Labor Law Administration, 8 COLUM. J.
LAW & Soc. PROB. 553, 563-66 (1972), for a comparison of 10(j) and 10(l) use in fiscal
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provoked some controversy and rekindled old fears. Opponents of the
amendments argued that to allow this remedy would be to transfer decision-
making from the NLRB to the courts, and that a better solution would be to
expedite Board procedures. 28  Congress believed, however, that such meas-
ures were called for because of the relatively slow hearing procedures of the
Board, and ,because dangers inherent in large-scale use of injunctions would
be obviated by the fact that only the Board, "acting in the public interest and
not in vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief ....
Congress, in the end, imposed no limitations on the Board's discretion to
seek temporary injunctions when the Board perceived a need for such
relief.3
0
The Board was slow to use its new powers under section 10(j) and,
although its use has steadily increased,3l there has been a continuing
realization of the need for injunctive relief to ensure compliance with the
purposes of the Act pending final determinations of charges before the
Board. The procedure of Board litigation is a lengthy one. From the filing
of unfair labor practice charges to the Board's final order and ultimate
enforcement by an appeals court, if necessary, may take years, during which
time the original relationships may have changed radically.8 2  Judge
Friendly's comment in 1961 is still timely:
year 1970. The courts have held that the same standards should apply in deciding
whether to grant 10(j) and 10(l) relief. Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit & Allied
Garment Workers, 494 F.2d 1230, 1242 (2d Cir. 1974).
28. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2 (1947) (minority report) ("the clear
result would be to throw a decision of the merits of such cases into the Federal district
courts and thus to oust the Board of jurisdiction, since it is not to be supposed that
district courts could act without some inquiry into the merits of the dispute .... ." id.
at 18-19). The Fifth Circuit agreed with this argument. See 515 F.2d at 1193-94.
29. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947). See The Role of the Temporary
Injunction, supra note 27, at 563-64.
30. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). See Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d
655, 660 (10th Cir. 1967).
31. Between 1948 and 1961, 47 10(j) petitions were filed, and of these only 11 were
against employers. Between 1961 and 1970, 150 10(j) petitions were filed and 77 were
granted. The Role of the Temporary Injunction, supra note 27, at 564 n.97, 566 table
3. See Siegel, Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act: Suggested Reforms
for an Expanded Use, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 457, 461 (1972). In fiscal
year 1975, there were 21 10(j) petitions filed, with 6 granted and 5 pending at the
end of the year. 40 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 34 (1975). See also McCulloch, supra note
26, at 95-100, in which the then chairman of the NLRB promised a more extensive use
of section 10(j) by the Board.
32. See P. Ross, THE GOVERNMENT As A SOURCE OF UNION POWER: THE ROLE OF
PUBLIC POLICY IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 170-72 (1965). Mr. Ross cites one case in
which seven years elapsed between the time the enforcement decree was entered and the
time the employer was adjudged in contempt. Id. at 171.
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The one and a half years it takes the National Labor Relations
Board to reach a decision ... [means that], apart from the cases
being conducted under the shelter of a preliminary injunction, the
ultimate decision almost never makes any practical difference to
the labor relations between the parties. 33
A variety of factors explain the reluctance of the Board and the courts to
make greater use of section 10(j). The procedure for obtaining an injunc-
tion is somewhat cumbersome: the original decision to seek section 10(j)
relief must be made by the NLRB in Washington, D.C., while subsequent
filing and litigation is conducted at the regional office level.3 4  Once filed,
however, the procedure has priority over other litigation, and since hearings
often proceed on the basis of affidavits, it can be disposed of expeditiously.85
A more serious problem has been the lack of clear standards to test the
necessity for relief. The statute speaks only of granting such relief as the
court "deems just and proper" after Board issuance of an unfair labor
practice complaint.36 Each court has decided on a case by case basis the
question of what constitutes a "just and proper" remedy.37  Most are in
33. NLRB v. Superior Fireproof Door & Sash Co., 289 F.2d 713, 723 n.6 (2d Cir.
1961), quoting Gardner, The Administrative Process, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS To-
DAY AND TOMORROW 119-20 (1959). More recently, Judge Leventhal, in IUE v. NLRB
(Tidee Products, Inc.), 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970),
noted that
Ifwlhen the company is finally ordered to bargain with the union some years
later, the union may find that it represents only a small fraction of the em-
ployees. . . . Thus the employer may reap a second benefit from his original
refusal to comply with the law: he may continue to enjoy lower labor expenses
after the order to bargain either because the union is gone or because it is too
weak to bargain effectively.
Id. at 1249.
34. See AMEMCAN BAR AssOCIAMON, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 850 (C. Morris
ed. 1971).
35. See Roth, supra note 6, at 358-61. In fiscal year 1970, the average time
to process a 10(j) petition in the General Counsel's office was 11 days. Siegel, supra
note 31, at 460 n.23. For the internal procedures of the Board regarding section 10(j),
see id. at 458-63.
36. 29 U.S.C § 170(j) (1970), quoted note 1 supra. For a discussion of the various
standards that have evolved, see Siegel, supra note 31, at 473-82; Note, Temporary In-
junctions Under Section 10(j) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181 (1969).
37. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967),
and cases cited therein. Reversing the grant of a 10(j) injunction, the court said:
[fhe courts] have resolved the question of the propriety of injunctive relief
on the basis of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While some
courts have used language which, considered out of context, would indicate that
a finding of "reasonable cause" alone is sufficient to grant injunctive relief, the
force of such expressions is diminished when considered in light of the circum-
stances of the case ....
Id. at 270.
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agreement that relief should be granted if the purposes of the Act will be
frustrated without it.as As can be seen from Trading Port and Pilot Freight,
however, even when two courts decide to make preservation of the status quo
a major component of that test, their perspectives, and thus their remedies,
can vary greatly. 9  Moreover, courts have generally been reluctant to in-
trude on the Board's statutory duty of investigation and adjudication. Quoting
Board Chairman McCulloch's assertion that this power must be exercised
"not as a broad sword, but as a scalpel, ever mindful of the dangers inherent
in conducting labor management relations by way of injunction, '40 the court
in McLeod v. General Electric Co.4I held that without proof of an over-
whelming need for an injunction, the Board would be abdicating its adminis-
trative duty to ask the courts to make interim decisions based on inadequate
knowledge of the facts. A major problem with the use of injunctions is the
lack of certainty as to their effectiveness. As was noted in a classic pre-
NLRA treatise, "the injunction cannot preserve the so-called status quo; the
situation does not remain in equilibrium awaiting judgment upon full knowl-
edge."42
All of these criticisms become more significant when the injunctive relief
requested is not simply a cease and desist order but also contains some
mandatory aspect, such as a bargaining order. There is strong concern that
an interim bargaining order might so change the relationship of the parties
38. See, e.g., Wilson v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, 491 F.2d 200 (8th
Cir. 1974) ("The propriety of injunctive relief does not depend upon traditional equita-
ble principles, but whether it is necessary to effectuate policy as announced by Con-
gress." Id. at 203); UAW v. NLRB (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
("Enforcement of the employer's obligation to bargain is crucial for implementation of
the policies of the Act, and the usually strict standards for equitable relief in private
actions do not apply when these important public purposes are threatened." Id. at
1051); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1967) (dis-
trict court should be able to conclude with reasonable probability from the circumstances
of each case that the remedial purpose of the Act would be frustrated unless immediate
action is taken); Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967) (injunctive relief is
necessary when there is "a reasonable apprehension that the efficacy of the Board's final
order may be nullified, or the administrative procedures will be rendered meaningless
.d. at 660.)
39. See 517 F.2d at 40; 515 F.2d at 1194.
40. Statement of Frank W. McCulloch, Chairman, NLRB, before the Eighth Annual
Joint Industrial Relations Conference, Michigan State University, April 19, 1962, quoted
in McLeod v. General Electric Co., 366 F.2d 847, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1966).
41. 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 87 S. Ct. 5 (1966), vacated and remanded,
385 U.S. 533 (1967).
42. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCrION 201 (1930). This was
noted in a discussion of the effects of injunctions on unions, but the authors stated: "Ju-
dicial error is too costly to either side of a labor dispute to permit perfunctory determi-
nation of the crucial issues; even in the first instance, it must be searching." Id.
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that even in the event of a Board ruling adverse to the union, its new
strength might be a fait accompli. 43  Thus, it is argued, a judicial determina-
tion, based on unclear standards, would replace the statutorily mandated
Board procedures. Conversely, it has been noted that an employer deter-
mined to resist his bargaining obligations will find ways to continue to evade
these responsibilities despite a bargaining order. Detailed studies by Philip
Ross of section 8(a) (5) violations and their aftermath vividly illustrate the
correlation between the passage of time pending a final decision and the sur-
vival of preexisting relationships: statistically, the "longer the litigation the
less likely was the prospect of the signing of a first contract. '44  Yet Ross
doubts that forced bargaining under an injunctive order would result in a fun-
damental change in an employer's behavior; he calls instead for a change
in the Board's procedures and compliance standards. 45
When the case involves a union that has not had a previous bargaining
relationship with the employer, these traditional objections to mandatory
injunctive relief are magnified. In fact, the validity of issuing a bargaining
order in such situations was in doubt until the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 46 Gissel held that a bargaining order could be
part of the Board's final remedy when a union had only a card majority and
had not been certified following a secret election if traditional remedies
would be unlikely to overcome the effects of the employer's past practices.
The Court reasoned that the Board may employ a bargaining order to
protect the employees' sentiment as previously ascertained through authori-
zation cards but distorted as a consequence of the employer's illegal actions.
Although the Court stressed that certification by an NLRB election is the
preferred route to establish the status of bargaining representative, it noted
that Congress specifically did not withdraw from the Board the authority to
order an employer to bargain on the basis of a card majority.4 7 The Court's
43. See Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 788 (5th Cir. 1973);
Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 86 L.R.R.M. 2976, 2980-81 (M.D. Fla. 1974). Sig-
nificantly, at the time when the district court must decide whether or not to grant the
injunction, the findings of the administrative law judge are rarely available.
44. P. Ross, The Labor Law In Action: An Analysis of the Administrative Process
Under the Taft-Hartley Act 6 (Report to NLRB, Sept. 1966). About two-thirds of the
cases closed before issuance of complaints resulted in execution of first contracts, but
less than 36 percent of the cases closed after circuit court enforcement ended with agree-
ments. id.
45. Id. at 31-32. Ross hypothesized from records which show that unions receiving
consent decrees did not sign more contracts than were obtained by other unions after
prolonged litigation. See also P. Ross, supra note 32, at 200-03.
46. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
47. Id. at 595-600. The employers had argued that the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments had eliminated the use of cards to determine a majority for representation
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concern in Gissel was to avoid "rewarding the employer and allowing him
to profit from [his] own wrongful refusal to bargain. '48
II. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND SOME POLICY CHANGES
Since Gissel was decided, the courts have been wrestling with its impact
and limits. The Supreme Court, in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co.
v. NLRB, 49 further refined Gissel by stating that when a union has a card
majority, but the employer has not engaged in unfair labor practices substan-
tial enough to impair the electoral process, the employer need not recognize
the union until it is duly certified in an election. If an employer unilaterally
undertakes to conduct a poll to determine whether a union has majority
status, however, the Board has found a duty to bargain when that poll indi-
cates majority support, although Linden may ultimately affect this policy. 50
The lower courts have liberally issued interim bargaining orders when prees-
tablished bargaining positions were being eroded by unfair labor practices,51
but when the union's representative status is not established, there has been
no clear-cut policy. In two recent cases, district courts based their refusal
to issue interim bargaining orders on the necessity of proceeding through nor-
purposes. The Court in Gissel pointed to the defeat of an earlier version of the bill
in the House which would have made recognition by the employer or certification under
section 9 the sole basis for bargaining as an indication of the lack of congressional intent
to remove cards as a method for ascertaining representation.
48. Id. at 610. The Court feared that the employer's ability to delay bargaining dur-
ing litigation would, in the end, destroy the ability to hold a fair election. In support
of this, the Court cited Board records which show that in the period between January
and June 1968, the median time between the filing of an unfair labor practice charge
and Board disposition of a contested case was 388 days. Id. at 611.
49. 419 U.S. 301 (1974). Linden involved two cases in which employers, who were
not charged with unfair labor practices independent of a refusal to bargain, refused to
recognize the unions' claimed majority status which was expressed through signed au-
thorization cards.
50. See Sullivan Elec. Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 809 (1972), enforced, 479 F.2d 1270 (6th
Cir. 1973), in which the employer's voluntary polling was held to imply an agreement
to abide by the results. See also Green Briar Nursing Home, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 503
(1973). The future of this policy is in doubt after Linden, which specifically reserved
decision on the effect of its holding on the situation presented in Snow & Sons, 134
N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962), which held that a duty
to bargain arises when an employer has broken an agreement to abide by third party
authentication of an apparent card majority. 419 U.S. at 310 n.10.
51. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Retired Persons Pharmacy, 84 L.R.R.M. 2599 (D.D.C.
1973); Johnston v. Georgetown Steel Corp., 76 L.R.R.M. 2515 (D.S.C. 1970); Little
v. Portage Realty Corp., 73 L.R.R.M. 2971 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Sacks v. Davis & Hemp-
hill, 295 F. Supp. 142 (D. Md. 1969); Kaynard v. Bagel Bakers Council, 57 CCH Lab.
Cas. 12,499 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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mal Board channels, on the determination that interim orders should not es-
tablish bargaining rights for uncertified unions, and on the delay involved be-
fore filing for the relief.52 In two other cases, interim orders were granted
on the basis of card strength; both courts cited potential frustration of the pur-
poses of the Act as the reason for the orders.
5 3
The importance placed by the Board on the remedial effects of bargaining
orders in Gissel situations is reflected in a recent policy change. In 1974
the NLRB decided in Steel-Fab, Inc.54 that a final bargaining order should
apply only as of the date of the Board's adjudication of the employer's unfair
labor practices conduct. Despite a strong dissent that this policy "would
allow the Respondent to escape with the fruits of its unlawful behavior"5 5 if
the order were not made retroactive to the date of illegal conduct, the
majority spoke of "a bargaining obligation which has no discernible existence
until our decision reveals that we have found it necessary to impose the
obligation as a remedy . . . ."" In the first case decided under this
policy, the employer shut down a plant after an administrative law judge
found substantial unfair labor practice violations but before the Board's final
decision, which included a prospective bargaining order that was totally
meaningless at that time. 57 The Board's decision in Trading Port, Inc.58
effectively overruled Steel-Fab. Noting that an employer's unilateral acts
before final adjudication were left unremedied by a prospective order, the
52. Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 385 (D. Mass. 1973); Kaynard v. Law-
rence Rigging, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. 2600 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
53. Smith v. Old Angus, Inc., 82 L.R.R.M. 2930 (D. Md. 1973); Henderson v. Gib-
bons & Reid Co., 53 CCH LAB. CAs. 11,081 (D.N. Mex. 1966) (pre-Gissel decision).
The General Counsel of the NLRB has gone even further in a Gissel situation by re-
questing a final bargaining order when, although the union had not obtained majority
status, "its failure to do so was considered directly attributable to the employer's unfair
labor practices. . . ." Report on Case-Handling Developments at NLRB, 90 LAB. REL.
REP. 1, 12 (Sept. 1, 1975).
54. 212 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 86 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1974).
55. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1483. (Jenkins, Member, concurring in part & dissenting in
part).
56. Id. at 1476.
57. Elm Hill Meats, 213 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 87 L.R.R.M. 1227 (1974). The em-
ployer, knowing that he had no duty to bargain over a decision to shut down his plant
if made for nondiscriminatory economic reasons, closed the operation two weeks after
the complaint was issued. By moving so quickly he avoided, because of the Steel-Fab
rule, what would have been mandatory bargaining over the effects of the shutdown on
the employees. See, e.g., Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972). In their dis-
sent in Elm Hill, Members Fanning and Jenkins observed that "the employer is left free
to engage in any sort of unilateral conduct to defeat the Union prior to issuance of the
Board's decision, including the elimination of all of its employees' jobs by transferring
the work to another plant." 213 N.L.R.B. at 1230-31.
58. 219 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 89 L.R.R.M. 1565 (1975).
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board ruled that an obligation to bargain "should commence as of the time
the employer has embarked on a clear course of unlawful conduct or has
engaged in sufficient unfair labor practices to undermine the union's majority
status." 59  Only by so doing could the order, in the spirit of Gissel, "re-
establish the conditions as they existed before the employer's unlawful
campaign." 0
HI. 10(j) BARGAINING ORDERS: THE NEXT STEP?
The importance of Trading Port and Pilot Freight and the necessity of
reaching a consistent policy to aid both the district courts and the Board is
evident. The Pilot Freight Court, expressing concern about legitimizing a
relationship that may never have existed and about unwisely injecting the
courts into labor disputes, would hold the line at Gissel. Recognizing that
ultimately the Board might issue a Gissel-type bargaining order as a final
remedy, the court also noted the possibility of a Linden situation,s ' in which
a duty to bargain would not arise until after an election had been won by
the union. Weighing the possible harm to the parties under each alternative,
the Fifth Circuit decided that the union would not be sufficiently harmed by a
continuation of its nonbargaining status to necessitate such judicial interven-
tion.62 Trading Port, on the other hand, would extend Gissel's final relief to
interim situations, continuing the steady increase of section 10(j) use to
reduce an employer's ability to dissipate union strength pending final Board
action. Discussing the underlying rationale in Gissel, the court in Trading
Port intimated that if the courts cannot issue interim bargaining orders, a
final order to bargain in a Gissel situation might prove meaningless. By the
59. 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
60 Id., quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969). A recent
decision with serious implications for the policy of applying interim relief retroactively
is Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 89 L.R.R.M. 2705 (3d Cir. 1975), in which dis-
trict courts in the Third Circuit were ordered to limit section 10(j) injunctions to six
months, renewable for an additional six months after the findings and recommendations
of the administrative law judge are entered. Hoping to engender a sense of urgency into
the Board proceedings, the court noted that "otherwise, a temporary injunction, entered
without reaching the ultimate merits of a dispute may become, in effect, a final disposi-
tion of the controversy." Id. at 2709. How much bargaining would go on under a 6-
month injunction is a matter of speculation.
61. See note 49 supra.
62. 515 F.2d at 1194. The message relayed by the appeals court to district courts
in the Fifth Circuit is somewhat ambiguous. While consistently talking in terms of re-
viewing the district court's opinion for abuse of discretion in issuing or denying section
10(j) injunctions, id. at 1192-93, the court appears to be holding that an interim bargain-
ing order should never issue when there is a nonincumbent union, see id. at 1194, thus
preserving little area for district court discretion in this matter.
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time the Board finally issues a bargaining order, the unfair labor practices in
the long period since the union initially asked for recognition may have so
undercut the union's strength that "effective representation is no longer
possible."03
The standards used by the two courts to ascertain the necessity for
injunctive relief are not markedly different. Both would use section 10(j) to
prevent frustration of the purposes of the Act and both see the preservation
of the status quo as the major consideration in effectuating that policy. But
the two decisions look to different relationships for the key to that status quo.
Pilot Freight would only impose a duty to bargain when there was a
preexisting bargaining relationship between the employer and the union.
With a nonincumbent union, an interim bargaining order would, in the Fifth
Circuit's view, create this relationship "by judicial fiat."'0 4  Trading Port is
concerned with another relationship, that between the employees and the
union. Finding this to be a fragile alliance, the Second Circuit based its
view of the status quo on the support once given by a majority of employees,
now endangered by employer actions deemed by the General Counsel and
by the district court of sufficient probability to allow a 10(j) cease and desist
order.
That a majority of the employees had signed authorization cards in each
case is not in dispute. It is the significance of that majority vote that is
questioned. Authorization cards have been criticized as unreliable indica-
tors of majority sentiment due to, among other factors, the confusion caused
by ambiguous cards, the possibility of misrepresentation by union organiz-
ers, and the inability of the employer to present his side of the argument
before the employee signs. 65  But in these cases there were no charges of
misrepresentation, ambiguity or coercion. Gissel recognized that authoriza-
tion cards are less reliable than elections, yet unequivocally stated that as
long as the cards adhered to the standards of the Cumberland Shoe doctrine60
"employees should be bound by the clear language of what they sign
"67
Clearly, the Second Circuit's view of the status quo as one that would
preserve the employees' expression of support for collective bargaining,
however susceptible to future change, is more in keeping with the legislative
63. 517 F.2d at 38.
64. 515 F.2d at 1194.
65. See Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966); Note, Refusal-
To-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA: Card Checks and Employee
Free Choice, 33 U. CHL L. REv. 387 (1966).
66. See note 7 supra.
67. 395 U.S. at 606.
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purpose behind section 10(j) and the Court's holding in Gissel than is the
Fifth Circuit's reliance on previous recognition as the touchstone for a
bargaining order. Since both courts found reasonable cause to believe that
employer unfair labor practices existed, and since the NLRB had authorized
the General Counsel to seek 10(j) relief, the probability was great that a
final Gissel bargaining order would issue automatically, thus legitimizing the
bargaining relationship.68 At that point, the importance of having main-
tained the previous union-employee relationship so as to have a meaningful
union-employer relationship is obvious.
There is no question that the Pilot Freight approach requires far less
judicial interference with Board functions, but whether this protects the
Board's "powers and prerogatives" is questionable. One must remember,
first, that it was the Board that requested the injunctive relief. It is ironic
that, in the name of maintaining orderly Board procedures, the court found it
necessary to deny the very relief requested. Secondly, if the Board ultimately
decides that the employer is guilty of unfair labor practices and includes a
Gissel bargaining order in the remedy, the absence of an interim order may
prove to have impeded rather than to have preserved Board procedures. The
short-lived Steel-Fab rule demonstrated that a Gissel final remedy is often
ineffective unless applied retroactively; it seems clear that an interim bar-
gaining order would be a valuable mechanism for assuring union stability
and averting unilateral actions by the employer pending the final decision
and order. The court in Trading Port, which agreed with Gissel that without
a bargaining order there can be no effective remedy against an employer who
has already been able to defeat a union in an election by pervasive unfair
labor practices, lamented that in such a situation, "the Board's adjudicatory
machinery may well be rendered totally ineffective."6' 9 Thus, by action or
by inaction when asked for interim relief, the courts may play a decisive role
in the outcome.
IV. CONCLUSION
When there is reasonable cause to believe that an employer has committed
unfair labor practices serious enough to preclude a fair election, interim
bargaining orders should be issued on the basis of authorization card
evidence of majority support. Taking into account the fact that a card
majority is less reliable as an indicator of employee sentiment than a secret
ballot, and understanding that employer recalcitrance can defeat the purpose
68. A bargaining order was part of the final decision and order of the Board in Trad-
ing Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 89 L.R.R.M. 1565 (1975). See p. 444 supra.
69. 517 F.2d at 38.
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of any bargaining order, especially one of limited duration, the Trading Port
remedy is nevertheless the one that best complies with Gissel and with the
legislative aims of section 10(j).
In the event that the charges against the employer are dismissed, the
interim bargaining order would cease and the parties would return to their
prebargaining status. If, as is more likely, the final decision is in the union's
favor, a final remedy will have little relevance unless the union's previous
strength has been maintained. It would be a pyrrhic victory indeed if a union
that won an unfair labor practice decision had lost its membership in the
interim.
Barbara B. Franklin
FEDERAL COURTS - Implied Private Federal Action Not
Available Under 18 U.S.C. § 610' When It Would Intrude On
Area Traditionally Committed To State Law Without Aiding
The Main Purpose Of The Act. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Although "[t]here is no federal general common law,"'2 there is a power in
the federal courts to find the implication of a private right of action when
Congress has enacted legislation without authorizing specific civil remedies.
3
This power plainly goes beyond statutory authority, since a showing of
congressional intent to create a right of action is not always necessary. 4 In
1. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 10
(1971), amended various provisions of earlier laws bearing upon the conduct of elec-
tions, including section 610. These amendments and the earlier laws are codified in
scattered sections of the code. Section 610 was based on The Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925, ch. 368, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074, and is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §
610 (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 610 (Supp. Feb. 1975). Though still com-
monly referred to as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, section 610 is today only one
prong of an expanding federal policy on campaign practices.
2. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). This language arose in the con-
text of a choice of law question in a diversity suit in federal court. For a recent dis-
cussion of its influence beyond that context, see Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie,
87 HAmv. L. Rv. 693 (1974). For an overview of Erie's effect on the federal common
law, see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 247-53 (2d ed. 1970).
3. For a discussion of the doctrine of implication prior to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), see Comment, Private Rights of Action
Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392
(1975).
4. [Un situations in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of
persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show [a congressional] intention
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this sense, an implied action is the creation of a common law court, albeit a
federal court.5 Recently, in Cort v. Ash, 6 the Supreme Court considered
whether a derivative action for damages could be implied from a criminal
provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act 7 prohibiting corporate
expenditures in connection with federal elections. In resolving the question,
the Court introduced a reformulated standard for the doctrine of implication
which for the first time emphasized that the doctrine is, in part, a matter of
federal common law and subject to one of its limitations-the "enclave" of
traditional state concerns.8
The case arose as a result of a print advertisement which appeared in
national magazines just prior to the 1972 presidential election. 9 Paid for by
the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the ad carried a headline which read: "I
say let's keep the campaign honest. Mobilize 'truth squads' . . . ." The
acknowledged source of the quote was Bethlehem's board chairman, Stewart
Cort. The body copy of the ad mentioned the name of no political party or
candidate, but it did attack a statement made by an unnamed candidate
critical of large corporations. Richard A. Ash, a stockholder, on his own
behalf and derivatively sought an injunction and damages,' 0 alleging that
to create a private cause of action ....
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975). Even stronger language may be found in Justice
Brennan's dissent in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 661 (1963) (Brennan J., dis-
senting).
5. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1412. The notion that the standard for implica-
tion is rooted in the "legislative" power of the federal courts is not a new one. See
Note, Implied Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 H.xv. L REV. 858, 863
& n.39 (1948).
6. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 610 (Supp. Feb. 1975). The
pertinent portion of this provision states that it "is unlawful . . . for any corporation
whatever . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election
at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors ... are to be voted for. . ....
For a discussion of the legislative purpose of this provision, see 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& Ad. NEws 1773 (1972); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
8. The Court poke of intruding "into an area traditionally relegated to state law."
422 U.S. at 78. The concept of an enclave of state concerns is one manner of phrasing
the extent of federal common law authority. Compare Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), with Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n. v. Parnell,
352 U.S. 29 (1956). For a discussion of the concept of the state enclave as a restric-
tion on federal court common law power in diversity cases, see Ely, supra note 2, at
700-06.
9. The ad is reproduced in Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
10. Ash sought a preliminary injunction about a month before the election; the Court
denied the request. Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227, 232 (1972). The appeals court af-
firmed the denial of the preliminary injunction, Ash v. Cort, 471 F.2d 811, 812 (3d Cir.
1973), and the case returned to the lower court for a final hearing on the permanent
relief which the plaintiff sought in the status of citizen, voter and corporate shareholder.
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the corporation through the actions of its directors had violated section 610
of the Federal Election Campaign Act. The district judge granted summary
judgment for the defendants on the initial ground that the plaintiff had no
private right of action under the statute." On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, taking the position that
unless Congress clearly indicates an intent to deny a cause of action, the
possible effectuation of legislative policies underlying the statute is sufficient
reason to imply one.1 2  Judge Aldisert dissented, arguing that a right of
action was dependent for its existence on certain ascertainable showings of
congressional intent.1 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unani-
mously reversed the decision of the appeals court, holding that as a
stockholder Ash had no federal cause of action for derivative damages under
section 610.14
The outcome of Cori depended upon the Court's resolution of two prelim-
inary questions: first, whether the implication of a private remedy would aid
the main purpose of section 610, and second, whether the implication of
a federal right of action would intrude into an area traditionally committed
to state law.
I. AN EXERCISE OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER
The doctrine of implication of private actions was first announced in 1916
in Texas & Pacific Railroad v. Rigsby. 15 The standard established was one
which closely paralleled the common law tort rule that violation of a criminal
statute raises some degree of presumption of negligence. 16 Justice Pitney
stated that "[a] disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act,
and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in
Of these, only the claim for derivative damages was treated by the Supreme Court on
the question of implication. 422 U.S. at 77.
11. Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
12. Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974).
13. Id. at 426 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
14. 422 U.S. at 84-85. The Court expressly reserved the question of whether there
exists a private right of action for injunctive relief, since it determined that a 1974
amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 610 (Supp. Feb.
1975), had intervened to relegate Ash's request for prospective relief to newly created
administrative procedures, at least in the first instance. 422 U.S. at 76-78 & nn.9 & 10.
15. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
16. See James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REv.
95 (1951); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REv.
361 (1932); Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L.
REv. 453 (1933).
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default is implied .... ,,17 The broadest reading of this language, how-
ever, would "suggest that for every written volume of Title 18 of the United
States Code there is an unwritten volume of Title 28,"'1 that is, that each
federal criminal statute is accompanied by an implied authorization for a
civil remedy. The necessity of narrowing the test forced the courts to seek
out qualifications that would restrict the spread of implication. 9 This trend
was reflected in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public
Service Co.20 and T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States,21 cases in which the
Supreme Court declared rules of statutory construction permitting courts to
deny implied actions when other evidence of congressional intent to withhold
such actions may otherwise have been insufficient.
22
This presumption of congressional intent to withhold private actions,
however, was expanded by some judicial opinions which restricted the
doctrine of implication to situations in which there was manifest an "intent to
create a private right of action by implication, ' '23 placing upon the prospec-
tive plaintiff the burden of showing that Congress had intended to do what it
did not do.2 4 This approach makes congressional intent the central concern
of the implication doctrine, relying upon -principles which go to the heart of
federal judicial power.
2 5
17. 241 U.S. at 39. The Rigsby standard emerged from an area of common law that
would seem to be a most obvious instance of a "general" common law. See 241 U.S.
at 39. The emphasis is not upon the statute, but upon the wrong committed despite
the statutory prohibition, so that one federal court could say, even after Erie, that the
"disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort." Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
18. 496 F.2d at 429 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
19. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1394-95.
20. 341 U.S. 246 (1951). The Court held that initial entrustment to an administra-
tive agency of prospective enforcement of a statute removes from the courts an ability
to imply an action for retroactive relief.
21. 359 U.S. 464 (1959). The Court held that implication is not available when a
statute is divided in parts, each governing the same basic conduct, and express private
remedies are available in the parts other than the one in question.
22. In Cort, however, the Supreme Court qualified the holding of T.I.M.E., empha-
sizing that the legislative history supported the Court's finding that Congress had in-
tended to deny a right of action in that case. 422 U.S. at 82 & n.14.
23. See, e.g., 496 F.2d at 427-48 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); cases cited note 25 infra.
24. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1407, 1413.
25. Critics of a liberal judicial policy towards implied rights of action have empha-
sized the important boundaries of a federal court's power: "(It is the Congress, and
not the federal judiciary, which creates subject matter jurisdiction for the federal courts."
Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d at 429 (Aldisert, J., dissenting);
In effect, appellants urge this court . . . to legislate. When Congress was deal-
ing with . . . the statutes here involved, it was capable of clearly and directly
providing the rights and remedies urged by the appellants.
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A different concept of implied actions was resurrected in J.I. Case v.
Borak.2 6 Under the facts in that case, the Court held that such actions were
available in that they provided "a necessary supplement" 27 to regulatory
agency action, and because "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional pur-
pose."' 28  The language suggests that implication provides those actions
which Congress could not foresee as necessary for its purposes, rather than
merely for those which Congress intended but for which it did not expressly
provide. 29  Borak thus came to represent a liberal application of the
implication doctrine, one in which the judiciary's role was active and
independent of legislative authority, though justified by general legislative
policy.30 The Borak standard simply required that the plaintiff and the
injury be those Congress intended to affect, and that, absent a private right
of action, the means legislated by Congress be inadequate to effectuate the
statute's purposes.
The precise status of the Borak approach, however, was placed in doubt
by the Court's 1974 decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
National Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak),"' which presented
what appeared to be a new position on implication. Although the Court
emphasized statutory construction and legislative history, it did not ignore the
question of the adequacy of the statute's means of enforcement in light of its
Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1042 (1972);
As respects the creation by the federal courts of common-law rights, it is per-
haps needless to state that we are not in the free-wheeling days antedating Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins ....
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
26. 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (right of action for derivative damages implied for vio-
lations of the Security Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78N(a) (1970)). That the
effectuation of congressional purpose as an element in implication had been deempha-
sized is evidenced in the language of a 1962 case, Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern
Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, in which the Court stated: "Finally, and not to be
overlooked, the absence of any judicial remedy places the shipper entirely at the mercy
of the carrier, contrary to the overriding purpose of the act." Id. at 88.
27. 377 U.S. at 432.
28. ld. at 433.
29. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1393-96; Note, Implying Civil Remedies From
Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285, 291 (1963). It is clear that this
rationale presumes a lawmaking function in the federal courts, in the traditional sense
of a common law court of limited subject matter jurisdiction. See D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 315 U.S. 477, 467-75 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
30. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967), in which
the standard was first clearly enunciated. This three-part test has nevertheless been
called the Borak test. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1396 n.24.
31. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
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legislative purpose.3 2 It appeared to some observers that the Court had
established a standard which was based upon a presumption against implied
actions.33 The Supreme Court in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Barbour3 4 added some weight to this conclusion, using the form of analysis
provided by Amtrak to deny a private remedy."" In dictum, however,
Barbour confirmed that congressional intent was not a prerequisite to an
implied civil action when Congress had "enacted a statute incapable of
achieving its purpose."36 The exact standard to be applied in such cases,
however, remained unclear.
Neither Amtrak nor Barbour, moreover, attempted to grapple with the
source of a federal court's power to imply an action, even by such a selective
standard, when Congress had not shown an intent to create such a right.37
Nevertheless, there have been several earlier cases in which the Court ad-
dressed the question. Most notable among them are Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics38 and Wheeldin v.
Wheeler,39 in which the Court made attempts to reconcile its prior holdings
with the notion that an implied action may be court-created, and therefore
a matter of federal common law, rather than a matter of simple statutory
32. The Court's consideration of the matter was relegated, however, to what seems
to have been a search for Congress' general attitude towards private actions as mani-
fested in the statutory framework. 414 U.S. at 461-65.
33. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1401-04. The suggestion was that rules of statu-
tory construction were the tools the Court was using to limit the potentially broad scope
of implication. Id. at 1394.
34. 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (customers of failing brokers are not entitled to implied ac-
tion under Securities Investors Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff (1970)).
35. The Court's analysis of the claim in Amtrak began with the observation that
express statutory provision for one form of proceeding ordinarily implies that
no other means of enforcement was intended by the Legislature. That impli-
cation would yield, however, to "clear contrary evidence of legislative intent,"
for which we turned to the legislative history and overall structure of the Am-
trak Act.
421 U.S. at 419, quoting Passenger Corp. v. Passenger Ass'n, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
36. Id. at 425. The Court apparently limited the availability of private actions on
this ground to situations in which the statute would be "practically unenforceable." Id.
at 424.
37. In Barbour, the Court noted the oft-quoted language of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 684 (1946): "'Where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute pro-
vides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done.'" 421 U.S. at 424.
38. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court held that a federal common law right of action
was available for a violation of fourth amendment rights. The primary distinction be-
tween Bivens and other implication cases might be found in the Court's traditional con-
cern for the preservation of the constitutional rights of the individual.
39. 373 U.S. 647 (1963). The plaintiff in Wheeldin sought a federal right of action
for abuse of congressional subpoena power. See note 25 supra.
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interpretation. 40 This failure to fully confront the common law aspect of the
implication doctrine may have been the cause of the varied judicial ap-
proaches vhich commentators have pointed to in the cases.41 But, in Cort
v. Ash, the Court seemed finally to accept that an implied right of action is
partially, if not essentially, a court-created right.
II. THE COURT DEFINES A STANDARD
In reaching its decision in Cort, the Court quickly disposed of claims for
injunctive relief on the ground that an amendment of the Federal Election
Campaign Act had intervened to provide an administrative procedure
through which requests for such relief could be made.42 This left only the
claim for derivative damages within the purview of the Court. At the outset,
Justice Brennan identified several factors considered relevant in the determi-
nation of "whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly pro-
viding one."
'43
Of the four factors mentioned, the first three were clearly gathered from
the mainstream of implication cases. Rigsby was cited for the proposition
that the plaintiff should be of the class "for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted . . . . 44 Amtrak was cited for the second factor, posing the
question whether there is "any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one."'4 5 The third factor,
also drawn from Amtrak, was phrased in terms of the consistency of the
implied action with "the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme." '46
40. In Wheeldin, Justice Brennan would have had the availability of a federal com-
mon law right of action turn on whether such a right was "'necessary or appropriate'
for dealing with 'essentially federal matters.'" 373 U.S. at 664 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing), quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). In Bivens,
Justice Harlan took a similar approach, stressing that the judiciary has a responsibility
to assure the workings of federal policy. 403 U.S. at 402-04 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 1393-97.
42. 422 U.S. at 74-77, citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 610 (Supp. Feb. 1975), amending 18
U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
43. Id. at 78. That the Court was relying upon an evaluation of flexible "factors"
for its consideration, rather than definitive requirements, is consistent with the common
law basis of the Court's decision. Such discretion would presumably have been inappro-
priate had the interpretation of a statute been involved. See, e.g., Nashville Milk Co.
v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1958).
44. 422 U.S. at 78, quoting 241 U.S. at 39. An alternative reading of the language
in Rigsby would suggest that the Court was distinguishing between special and general
public injury. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
45. 422 U.S. at 78. Some commentators had suggested that this might be the single
principle for which Amtrak stood. E.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 1401-04.
46. 422 U.S. at 78, 83 n.14. The cited portion of the Amtrak opinion may be read
as a ganeralized search for congressional intent. See note 32 supra.
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The Court's reliance upon these factors, however, departed from its view
in prior cases. The Court apparently used the language in Rigsby to
distinguish the primary and secondary beneficiaries of the statute in ques-
tion, 47 and then determined that the plaintiff stockholder was a secondary
beneficiary. 48  In reference to this distinction, the Court stated that a
primary beneficiary's right of action would not be dependent upon a showing
of congressional intent to create an action, although an express purpose to
deny one would be controlling. 49 In this context, the Court sought to
explain the emphasis on statutory construction developed in Amtrak and
T.I.M.E. by declaring that those rulings denying actions were grounded
primarily upon specific support found in the legislative history.50
In spite of the fact that it had found that the derivative plaintiff was
neither the main beneficiary of section 610 nor the subject of any legislative
intention as to civil remedies, the Court inquired whether allowing a cause of
action would serve the main purpose of the statute.51 This portion of the
opinion leaves the distinct impression that the presence of this factor alone
would have entitled Ash to an action in the district court.52  The Court
found, however, that a derivative action would not be helpful in enforcing
the Act.53
At that point, the Court made a significant departure from the line of
47. This hierarchy of protected persons, like the distinction the Court made between
the main and secondary purposes of the Act, appears to be arbitrary and less than con-
sistent with strict adherence to the approach of looking to congressional purpose. As
the appeals court stated: "It may be improper to infer a cause of action from
a statute only incidentally protecting plaintiff, [but] the Supreme Court has indicated
that protection of stockholders was not merely an incidental purpose of § 610 ....
496 F.2d at 423. Thus, it is more appropriate to take the distinction as the Court's own.
48. 422 U.S. at 80-82.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 82-83 n.14. Apparently, the Court wanted to lay to rest the mechanical
application of the maxim "espressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of the other) as a rule of statutory construction in the absence
of additional support from legislative history. See also 496 F.2d at 427 (Aldisert J., dis-
senting). This rule has been said to be the most prominent example of the presumption
against implication. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1416-21.
51. 422 U.S. at 84.
52. The Court also considered a fourth factor, the significance of state law regula-
tion, see notes 54-57 & accompanying text infra, but since the Court's determination of
this issue hinged upon its finding that Ash's action would not further the main purpose
of the Act, it seems reasonable to assume that had the action been found helpful in ef-
fectuating the main purpose of section 610, the principle of Borak would have applied
and the dominion of state law regulation would not have been considered. See 377 U.S.
at 434. If regarded as an independent ground for implication, the advancement of con-
gressional purpose could logically stand alone as a ground for implication.
53. 422 U.S. at 84.
454 [Vol. 25:447
Casenotes
cases on implied rights of action. The fourth factor it considered was
whether or not a private federal action would unnecessarily "intrude into an
area traditionally committed to state law . ... ,,4 This is the concept of
the protected enclave of state law that has been offered as a general
restriction on the reach of the common law power of the federal courts.
55
The Court first determined that the relationship of a shareholder to a
corporation was within that enclave, and relying upon Borak, determined
that the intrusion of a federal action would be appropriate if it effectuated
the main purpose of the statute."" Since it had previously answered the latter
question negatively, the Court concluded that a right of action should not be
allowed.
57
In essence, the analysis of Cort proceeds from the question of congression-
al intent to create a cause of action in a particular plaintiff, to the question of
the main congressional purpose and whether a right of action would effec-
tuate it. It is not altogether clear, however, that the Court's treatment of the
final factor, the dominion of state law, is anything more than an obverse
expression of the principle that no private federal action is available when no
federal policy would be advanced.58
III. Tm NEW FACTORS IN IMPLICATION
The Supreme Court in Cort made the pertinent distinction between
implied rights of action founded upon congressional intent, and those which
arise out of the common law power of the federal judiciary.59  The
54. Id. at 85.
55. This approach at limiting the range of federal common law, and even federal leg-
islative power, see, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 97 (1937)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting), has been most prominent in questions concerning the foun-
dation of the Erie doctrine. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring). There is a serious question as to whether the concept of a
state enclave, given the relationship of the federal to the state government, is anything
more than a negative expression of the extent of federal interests. See Ely, supra note
2, at 701-02.
56. The qualification that the purpose be the main or primary one intended by Con-
gress does not appear in Borak, which contains language to the contrary. 377 U.S. at
432. It would seem that this segregation of purposes is related to the Court's original
finding that a stockholder is not a primary beneficiary. The concept of purposes of
varying importance had been used to dissect section 610 in an unrelated argument. See
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 135-38 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
57. 422 U.S. at 85. The loop in the Court's logic testifies to the indefiniteness of
the state enclave factor. See note 55 supra.
58. The question left open is whether, in the absence of congressional intent, a right
of action would be permitted to serve a subsidiary purpose of the statute if to do so
would not intrude upon a state enclave.
59. See note 4 supra.
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distinction permitted the Court to isolate a group of cases6° which had
apparently expressed a presumption against implication, and to limit their
scope to cases in which on the whole there is a clear legislative intent to
deny a right of action.
When the Court addressed the problem of setting the standard that should
determine the availability of court-created private actions, however, it was
left with the broad principle of Borak, extending to the full sphere of federal
legislative concerns. The need for restriction manifested itself in both the
Court's unrationalized and somewhat arbitrary division between the main
and subsidiary purposes of the statute in question, and the emergence of the
state enclave limitation."' Whatever considerations moved the Court, two
novel and restrictive elements were introduced into the law of implied
actions. Given that court-created rights of action are the subject, it is not
inappropriate that the Court develop new standards in a situation in which
it has established the need.
Yet, it may be suggested that the more durable of judge-made principles
are clearly related to the judicial policy objectives they pursue. It was never
stated why, for example, a federal court should not be willing to imply an
action and intrude upon the state enclave to effect a subsidiary purpose of
Congress, particularly when it has been expressed as clearly as in the history
of section 610. Nor did the Court express the principle underlying its finding
that, in this case, derivative damages would not aid the main purpose of
section 610 in deterring the influence of corporations over federal elec-
tions.62 It seems apparent that some sort of presumption was at work, since
it is not difficult to argue that damages would necessarily enhance the
enforceability of a criminal provision.
63
60. Cases cited notes 20 & 21 supra. See also note 50 supra.
61. A probable reason for the Court's line drawing is that the full exercise of federal
common law power to create implied actions through the Borak standard would be im-
practical. It has been suggested that this was the rationale of Amtrak:
I am persuaded that the Amtrak court could not fail to notice the plethora of
implied civil remedy cases which arose from an unrestricted application of J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak .... I am convinced that the Amtrak court consciously
and deliberately applied the brakes ....
496 F.2d at 429 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The Amtrak restrictions were, however,
based upon the issue of congressional intent, and were therefore an imperfect means to
accomplish the task of making court-made law an effective tool of federal legislative
purpose.
62. 422 U.S. at 84.
63. The Court suggested that derivative damages would only have the effect of per-
mitting directors to temporarily "borrow" corporate funds in order to make campaign
contributions. id. at 84. The Court's decision would appear to give the directors




Finally, the Court's emphasis on the enclave of state law as a possible
measure of the availability of implied actions does not seem sufficient to
place any additional restriction on implication. 4  In other areas of the
federal common law, the enclave marks the borders of substantial federal
interests. In the matter of implied federal actions, however, the traditional
state concern is of an ambiguous character, since the basis for an implied
action is the presence of a federal policy which normally would supersede
traditional state dominion.65
In sum, the new restrictions that emerged in Cori suggest that the Court
will more closely exercise authority over judicially-created rights. The precise
nature of these restrictions, however, does not seem to be consistent with
the objectives for which such authority might be exercised.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the major premises underlying the decision in Cort v. Ash is that
courts retain the power to create implied rights of action when necessary to
effectuate congressional policy. It follows, therefore, that the restrictions
placed upon that power are also created by the federal judiciary and involve
primarily questions of court self-administration, 66 rather than questions of
statutory construction or the scope of traditional state authority. The courts
would simply be unable to entertain the volume of actions that could
arguably effectuate all the main purposes of congressional enactments.
In light of these considerations, perhaps the courts should provide only those
rights of action which would be most effective in enforcing congressional pur-
poses.
67
64. See note 55 supra. The value of having state courts enforce federal rights, once
they are found to exist, is obvious. See generally Note, State Enforcement of Federally
Created Rights, 73 HAsv. L. REv. 1551 (1960).
65. For a discussion of the pros and cons of relegating the implication plaintiff to
his state remedies, see Comment, supra note 3, at 1436; Note, supra note 29, at 292-
93. This topic in the specific context of 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) is discussed in Com-
ment, Civil Responsibility for Corporate Political Expenditures, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
1327, 1335-36 & n.48 (1973).
66. See note 61 supra. A federal court may create rights of action to effectuate a
congressional purpose. But because the federal courts are essential to the federal system,
see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that purpose cannot be ful-
filled if the courts are overcrowded with causes of action which individually pro-
mote a federal interest. Inherent in the power to create rights of action, therefore, is
the power to limit them for the sake of competent performance. The doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction of an administrative agency exemplifies judicial self-administration for
the purpose of efficiency. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426 (1907) (plaintiff challenging rates filed with ICC required to resort initially
to Commission).
67. See Note, supra note 5: "It being a reasonable assumption that Congress in-
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Absent a showing of congressional intent in regard to the vesting of a right
of action, the federal judiciary, under this criterion, would be free to
compare potential plaintiffs and to determine which class among them would
best aid the enforcement of the provision in question. The most effective
implied action might be found by balancing this factor against the extent to
which a particular class of potential plaintiffs, because of its size, threatens to
eventually increase congestion in the federal court system. 8 In this way, an
implied action would not be denied when, both in theory and in fact, it
promotes the means and the ends of congressional policy.
Stephen Czajkowski
tended an effective method of enforcement ... [t]his assumption ... justifies the
courts . . . in devising, within the framework of the statute, the method they consider
likely to be most effective." Id. at 863. The standard should flow from the rationale,
rather than from the polymorphous variations that result from the legislative process,
such as the presence of multiple congressional purposes. Logically, the secondary purpose
of one statute may be more important to Congress than the main purpose of another.
68. The political candidate and party allegedly injured by the defendants in Cort, for
example, would seem more likely to be motivated to seek enforcement of section 610
than any particular shareholder of Bethlehem Steel. Implied actions in favor of such
plaintiffs, moreover, could only result in a relatively minor increase in the volume of
litigation.
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